Incorrect and false record of proceedings
During the oral arguments, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to dub the 25 PILs filed by the petitioner as "blackmailing". However, the order passed by this Hon'ble Court seems to have eschewed from so correctly recording the proceedings inasmuch as the said word "blackmailing" is missing from the said order. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that this Hon'ble Court has resorted to a multi-cornered mendacity and falsehood and a smorgasbord of deliberate deceptions with an evil intention to cause a gross, grave, outrageous and grotesque miscarriage of justice.
During the oral arguments, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to dub the 25 PILs filed by the petitioner as "blackmailing". However, the order passed by this Hon'ble Court seems to have eschewed from so correctly recording the proceedings inasmuch as the said word "blackmailing" is missing from the said order. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that this Hon'ble Court has resorted to a multi-cornered mendacity and falsehood and a smorgasbord of deliberate deceptions with an evil intention to cause a gross, grave, outrageous and grotesque miscarriage of justice.
Inadvertent Mistakes In
The Plaint Cannot Be Refused To Be Corrected: SC [Read Judgment]
[7/8, 21:39] Neeta
Saxena: https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/183691621/?formInput=Inadvertent%20Mistakes%20In%20The%20Plaint%20Cannot%20Be%20Refused%20To%20Be%20
Supreme Court of India, Varun Pahwa vs Renu Chaudhary on 1 March,
2019
9. The memo of
parties is thus clearly inadvertent mistake on the part of the counsel who
drafted the plaint. Such inadvertent
mistake cannot be refused to be corrected when the mistake is apparent from
the reading of the plaint. The Rules of Procedure are handmaid of justice and
cannot defeat the substantive rights of the parties. It is well settled that
amendment in the pleadings cannot be refused merely because of some mistake,
negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of Procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the
pleadings even if a party is negligent or careless as the power to grant
amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not
governed by any such narrow or technical limitations.
If the
power to correct inadvertant mistakes is
not recognised and accepted, it may lead to perpetuation of injustice and to
undesirable consequences. A person whose rights are so affected by an illegal
order passed behind his back need not be compelled to rush to court to get it
set aside, on pain of its being held binding otherwise. The authority concerned
can itself remedy the mischief, on its being apprised of its mistake and
the injustice flowing therefrom. (See in this connection Karunakaran Nambiar v.
Director of Public Instruction 1966 KLT 290). Such an
order does not affect any rights of the party benefitting by the mistake,
as no rights legally inhered in him by virtue of the mistaken
order.
Supreme
Court of India
J.K.Synthetics
Ltd. Ã Appellant vs K.P.Agrawal & Anr. Ã Respondents on 1 February, 2007
a) If there is an arithmetical or clerical or typographical error
in the order, it can be corrected.
b) Where the court had said something which it did not intend to
say or omitted something which it intended to say, by reason of any accidental
slip/omission on the part of the court, such inadvertentmistake can
be corrected.
c) The power cannot be exercised where the matter involves
rehearing on merits, or reconsideration of questions of fact or law, or
consideration of fresh material, or new arguments which were not advanced when
the original order was made. Nor can the power be exercised to change the
reasoning and conclusions.
Amendments of Pleadings under CPC Order 6 Rule 17.
Pleading should contain the facts but no law should be applied
in pleadings. Only the court has the power to apply the law on the basis of
fact stated in the Pleadings. In the case of Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lal Firm v.
Madho Prasad,1 Privy Council Appeal No. 5 of 1942 (From Patna:
Patna Appeal No. 9 of 1939) ,
honorable court stated that Pleadings should be defined in four words – “Plead
Facts, not laws”. https://blog.ipleaders.in/amendments-of-pleadings-cpc/
BHC Malaysian
International Trading ... vs Mega Safe Deposit Vaults (P.) Ltd. on 27 January,
2006
P27. Under Order 6 Rule 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1909,
every pleading shall contain a statement in concise
form of material facts relied on by a party but
not the evidence nor the law of which
a court may take judicial notice.
P.Chidambaram : vs R.S.Raja Kannappan on 7 June, 2012 madras high
court
P!!50 There is distinction between facta
probanda (the facts required to be proved, i.e. material facts)
and facta probantia (the facts by means of which
they are proved, i.e. particulars or evidence). It is settled law that pleadings
must contain only facta probanda and not facta
probantia. The material facts on which the party relies for
his claim are called facta probanda and they must be stated in
the pleadings. But the facts or facts by
means of which facta probanda (material facts) are
proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia (particulars
or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are
not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required
to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in
issue.
On the other hand, my submission is that nobody
shall be harmed due to a mistake of the court. Actus curiae neminem gravabit.
Please see paras 17 and 18 of CMP for "Court cannot traverse beyond
the scope of pleadings." Reliance may be placed to the
judgement passed in the case Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority
-Vs.- S.Vasudeva reported in 2000(2) SCC.439 where it was held that Court should not travel beyond the scope of the writ
petition and/or beyond the pleading therein. Supreme Court of India Commissioner
Bangalore ... vs S. Vasudeva And Ors on 18 January, 2000
Bench:
B.N. Kirpal, M.B. Shah
CASE NO.:Appeal (civil) 456-458 of 2000
COMMISSIONER BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VS VASUDEVA AND ORS.DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/01/2000
: Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)Judgement
Passed In The Case The ... vs T.R.Challappan Reported In Air ... on 30 June,
2009
Material and relevant …..has not accidently not been considered by court
Relevant portion miscarriage of justice has occurred same may be rectified
Mohamed akram ansari
To perpetuate an error in not heroism .to
Rectify is compulsion of judicium.
In course of submission, reference was made to
the decision of the Apex Court in the case between Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs. Chief Election Officer & Ors., as reported
in (2008) 2 SCC 95. The Apex Court in the said case observed that 'there is
a presumption in law that a judge deals with all the points which have been
pressed before him. It often happens that in a petition or appeal several
points are taken in the memorandum of the petition or appeal, but at the time of arguments only some of
these points are pressed............ If a point is not mentioned in the
judgment of a Court, the presumption is that that point was never pressed
before the learned judge and it was given up. However, that is a rebuttable
presumption. In case the petitioner
contends that he had pressed that point also (which has not been dealt with in
the impugned judgment), it is open to him to file an application before
the same learned Judge (or Bench) which delivered the impugned judgment and
if he satisfies the Judge (or Bench) that the other points were in fact
pressed, but were not dealt with in the impugned judgment, it is open to the
Court concerned to pass appropriate orders, including an order of
review...........'
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/322690/ https://indiankanoon.org/doc/128315199/ https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=To+perpetuate+an+error+in+not+heroism
https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=to+perpetuate+an+error+is+heroism+doctypes%3Asupremecourt
beyond the scope of
pleading https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=beyond%20the%20scope%20of%20pleading%20+doctypes:supremecourt
accidental mistake
can be corrected https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=accidental+mistake+can+be+corrected+%3A+supremecourt
beat about the bush ……. https://www.supremecourtcases.com/index2.php?option=com_content&itemid=1&do_pdf=1&id=275
In the circumstances and for the reasons stated above both the Court and the
parties have been beating about the bush. Counsel for the principal respondent
omitted to hit the Bull's eye. He ought to have raised a preliminary objection:
Judge misbehave
contempt of court ; https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/114065311/?formInput=judge%20misbehave
Without bothering
about the performance .
judge impropriety https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=judge%20impropriety%20
Kerala HC Upholds Rs.1 Lakh Compensation To Man
Who Was Illegally Detained On Suspicion Of Being A 'Maoist' [Read Judgment]
https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/kerala-hc-upholds-compensation-illegally-detained-suspicion-maoist-146167
https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/kerala-hc-upholds-compensation-illegally-detained-suspicion-maoist-146167
Ordinarily, a
litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the
parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the
plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as
possible, adjudication be done on
merits.
Judicial Disciline
traversed beyond the scope of the pleadings
of the case.
disposing of matters on ‘merits’ https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=disposing+of+matters+on+%E2%80%98merits%E2%80%99
In the legal arena, an attempt should always be made to allow the
matter to be contested on merits rather than to throw it on such technicalities……It is the duty of
the Court to see to it that
justice should be done between the parties…..” https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=justice+should+be+done+between+the+parties%E2%80%A6..%E2%80%9D+
“Scope of the Power of Rectification
) Because it is settled law that when prejudice results from an order
attributable
to the Court’s mistake, error or omission, then it is the duty of the
Court to set it right; atonement to the wronged party by the Court for the
wrong
committed by it has nothing to do with
the concept of inherent power
to review, vide
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v CIT, (2007)
295 ITR 466 (SC):
“Scope of the Power of Rectification
Because it is settled law
that no act of the Court should harm
a litigant
and
it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a
mistake
of the Court he should be restored to the position he
would have
occupied but for that mistake, vide, inter alia, AIR
1966 SC 1631, Jang Singh
v Brij Lal & others:
Once the Court comes to the
conclusion that a wrong order has
been passed, it becomes the solemn
duty of the Court to rectify the
mistake rather than perpetuate the same
While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v State of Andhra Pradesh,
AIR
1993 SC 1048 observed as under:
“…..To
perpetuate an error is no heroism. To
rectify
it is the compulsion of
judicial conscience
Because it is
settled law that no
one shall suffer for an act of the
court
is not a rule confined to an erroneous
act of the court; the act of the
court embraces within its sweep all
such acts as to which the court may form
an opinion in any legal proceeding that
the court would not have so acted had it
been correctly apprised of the facts
and the law, vide, inter alia,
South
Eastern Coalfields Limited v State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648:
The settled principle of law is that the actus
curiae neminem
gravabit - 'act of the court shall not harm
anybody'.
The court may
not have a suo motu power to amend a
decree but the same would
not mean that the court cannot
rectify a mistake. If a
property was subject matter of pleadings
and the court did not
frame an issue which it ought to have
done, it can, at a later
stage, when pointed out, may amend the
decree.
Learned
senior counsel for the appellants would submit that the maxim actus curiae neminemgravabit or
“an act of the court shall prejudice no man” is a settled principle of law and applicable
in the present case.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition as noted by the
High Court that a party cannot be made to suffer on account of an act of the
Court. There is a well recognised maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit which
means an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon
justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the
administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia, i.e.
the law does not compel a man to do that what he cannot possibly perform. The
applicability of the abovesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey and ors. vs.
Tarapada Dey and Ors. 1987 (4) SCC 398, Gursharan Singh vs. New Delhi
Municipal Committees1996 (2) SCC 459 and Mohammed Gazi vs. State of
M.P. and Ors. 2000 (4) SCC 342."
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/61939581/ speculation order
He ought to know that speculations, suspicions, conjectures, surmises
and assumptions cannot take the place of proof and evidence, vide P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v The District Inspector of Police (SC, 14.9.2015, Para
25)
The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure
that miscarriage of justice is avoided.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1306 OF 2003, Supreme Court of India
Sannaia Subba Rao &
Ors vs State Of A.P on 24 July, 2008
Law is well settled with
regard to the fact that however strong the suspicion may
be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion,coincidence,
grave doubt cannot take the place of proof.
Always a duty is cast upon the Courts to ensure that suspicion does
not take place of the legal proof. Supreme
Court of India Sheila Sebastian vs R.Jawaharaj on 11 May, 2018 Idle speculation, suspicion, conjectures and surmises cannot take the
place of evidence.
Making Of Fake Document Is Different Than Causing It To Be Made;
Only Maker Can Be Charged With Forgery: SC
https://www.livelaw.in/making-of-fake-document-is-different-than-causing-it-to-be-made-only-maker-can-be-charged-with-forgery-sc/ Case name: Sheila Sebastian vs R. Jawaharaj Date of Judgment: May 11, 2018
https://www.livelaw.in/making-of-fake-document-is-different-than-causing-it-to-be-made-only-maker-can-be-charged-with-forgery-sc/ Case name: Sheila Sebastian vs R. Jawaharaj Date of Judgment: May 11, 2018
Because
it is settled law that no one shall suffer for an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the act of the court embraces within
its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal
proceeding that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly
apprised of the facts and the law, vide, inter alia, South Eastern Coalfields Limited v State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648:
Because the said
accidental mistakes are also rectifiable on the authoritative decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in SCR 2009 (2) 452,
Tilak Raj v Baikunthi Devi:
Since the court exists to dispense justice, any
mistake….should be allowed to be
rectified by exercising inherent power vested in the court for sub-serving the cause of justice. The
principle behind the provision is that no
party should suffer due to bona fide mistake. Whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must
be properly reflected therein otherwise
it would only be destructive of the principle of advancing the cause of
justice. In such matters, the court should not bind itself by the shackles of
technicalities.
In S. Satnam Singh and Ors. vs.
Surender Kaur and Anr., reported
in 2008 (15) SCALE 626 Court held
as follows:
“21. The court may not
have a suo motu power to amend a
decree but the same
would not mean that the court cannot
rectify a mistake. If a
property was subject matter of pleadings
and the court did not
frame an issue which it ought to have
done, it can, at a
later stage, when pointed out, may amend the
decree.
22. The power of amendment,
in a case of this nature, as noticed
hereinbefore, would not
only be dependent upon the power of
the court but the
principle that a Court shall always
be ready and willing
to rectify the mistake it has
committed.””
Actus curiae neminem gravabit.
An act of the Court shall prejudice no man.
It is
the duty of the Court to enforce that obligation
unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real
justice of the case.
A
party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter
blame the Court.
The
aforesaid judgments are passed on the application of legal maxim “sublato fundamento
cadit opus”, which means in case a foundation
is removed, the superstructure falls.”
We appreciate the manner in
which the learned Judge accepted his mistake and granted relief to the
respondents.”
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLR 2005 (6) 1, Rajinder Singh v Lt.
Governor, Andaman and Nicobar Islands: “9…..Law is well-settled that the power of
judicial review of its own order
by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to
prevent mis-carriage of justice.
The maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit (act of the court cannot cause any prejudice and loss to the
party) is also applicable to the facts of the present case. The said doctrine is applicable not only to acts of the courts which
are erroneous but also applicable to all such acts of the court which the court
would not have directed after it had
been apprised of the correct facts and the law.
Because it is settled law that interest
in finality of the decision must
yield where the interest of
justice so requires.
As held in Rupa
Ashok Hurra v Ashok
Hura, (2002) 4 SCC 388:
“The concern of this Court for
rendering justice in a cause is
not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. We
are
faced with competing principles — ensuring certainty and finality
of
a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on
reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being
in
violation of the principle of
natural justice or apprehension of bias due
to a Judge who participated in
decision making process not disclosing
his links with a party to the case, or
abuse of the process of the court.
Such
a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under
the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute
justice - a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of the
view
that though Judges of the highest court do their best,
subject
of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations
may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require
reconsideration
of a final judgment to set right miscarriage
of
justice complained of. In
such case it would not only be proper but
also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After
giving our anxious consideration to the question, we are persuaded
to hold that the duty to do
justice in these rarest of rare cases shall
have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it
is
essentially in the public interest that a final judgment of the final
court
in the country should not be open to challenge, yet there
may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to
reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience
and would cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice. It
may be
useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of United States in
Ohio Power Company's case
(supra). In that case the Court of Claims
entered judgment for refund of tax, alleged to have been overpaid, in
favour of the tax payer. On the application of the Government a writ of
certiorari against that judgment was declined by the Supreme Court of
United States in October 1955. The Government sought re-hearing of
the case by filing another application which was dismissed in
December 1955. A second petition for hearing was also rejected in May
1956. However, in June 1956 the order
passed in December 1955 was
set aside sua sponte (of its own motion) and that case was ordered to be
heard along with two other pending cases in which the same question
was presented. In those two cases the Supreme Court held against the
tax payer and, on the authority of that judgment, reversed the judgment
of the Court of Claims. Four learned members of the Court, in
per curiam opinion, rested the decision "on the ground of interest in
finality of
the decision must yield where the interest of justice so
required". Three
learned members dissented and held that denial of
certiorari
had become final and ought not to be disturbed. Two learned
members,
however, did not participate.
The upshot of the discussion in our view is
that this Court, to
prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of
justice, may re-consider its judgments in exercise of its inherent
power.”
As held in AIR 1964 SC 72, S. Partap Singh v State of Punjab:
“The Constitution enshrines and
guarantees the rule of law and Art.
226 is designed to ensure that each
and every authority in the State,
including the Government, acts bona
fide and within the limits of its
power and we consider that when a
Court is satisfied that there is an
abuse or misuse of power and its
jurisdiction is invoked, it is
incumbent on the Court to afford justice to the individual.”
Because the said grave, manifest and accidental
slips, omissions, errors
and mistakes and the said flagrant miscarriage of
justice are inconsistent with
a rational system of justice.
Because it is settled law that “when the law gives anything to anyone, it
gives also all those things without which the
thing itself would be unavailable”,
So far legal position is
concerned, there would hardly be any doubt about the proposition that in terms
of Section 152 C.P.C., any error occurred in the decree on account of
arithmetical or clerical error or accidental
slip may be rectified by the court. The principle behind the provision is
that no party should suffer due to mistake of the court and whatever is
intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly
reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of
advancing the cause of justice. Supreme Court of IndiaJayalakshmi
Coelho vs Oswald Joseph Coelho on 28 February, 2001, [(2001) 4 SCC 181],
vide 2001
(8) SCC 570, Dinesh Dutt Joshi v State of Rajasthan.
At best, then,
it would be a situation where an applicant has filed
an application
which is couched under the wrong provision of law.
There is no
dispute that the court has jurisdiction to review or
modify/recall an
order passed. It is well settled that the court
having jurisdiction to grant the
relief sought in an application
would not be
precluded from doing so, merely because an
application has
been couched under a wrong provision of law.
Because it is settled law that the petitioner has an
inalienable right to
pray for rectification of the said accidental mistakes till
they are corrected;
there is no bar of res judicata in the correctional
jurisdiction.
39) Because the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case speak
for themselves, and, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur(the principle that the mere occurrence of some
types of accident is sufficient to imply negligence.) squarely applies
to them.
(40) Because it is settled law that the Hon’ble
High Court does not act like a
proverbial “bull in a china shop” in
the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226, vide 1999 (1) SCC 741, UP State Cooperative Land Development
Bank Ltd. v Chandra Bhan Dubey, Para 27.
passed
a non-speaking order in violation of
the principles of naturaljustice.
In this
view of the matter we are of opinion that the petitioner is entitled to release
as the orderby which he was detained is no order under
the Rules for it was passed without the application of
themind of the authority concerned.
Supreme court pronouncement is binding on lower
courts SC
Pronouncement Binding On HCs Even If It Cannot Be Strictly Called 'Ratio
Decidendi', Reiterates SC Supreme Court of India
The Peerless Gen.Fin And
... vs Commnr. Of Income Tax on 9 July, 2019
Article 141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on
all courts The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts
within the territory of India
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/sc-pronouncements-binding-on-high-courts-even-if-not-strictly-ratio-decidendi-146336
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/sc-pronouncements-binding-on-high-courts-even-if-not-strictly-ratio-decidendi-146336
P10 We reiterate that though the Court’s focus
was not directly on this, yet, a pronouncement by this Court, even if it cannot
be strictly called the ratio decidendi
of the judgment, would
certainly be binding on the High Court.
In our view, by passing such an order, the High Court has
literally stepped into the shoes of the
Disciplinary Authority, which is impermissible. It needs to be mentioned, that,
the High Court in cases of departmental enquiries and the
findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of the appellate court/
authority. It is settled law that imposition of punishment is within the power
and discretion of the disciplinary authority. It is not necessary to refer to
the decisions on this topic.
orders were arbitrary, discriminatory and
unrelated to the object. below is
found to be arbitrary, purely speculative, and, based
on no evidence, order is arbitrary,
without enquiry, surmisical, speculative, against law and facts of
the case
intemperate language
A Mere Incorrect Averment
In Affidavit Cannot Be Classified As Fraud: Madras HC [Read Order]
https://www.livelaw.in/mere-incorrect-averment-affidavit-cannot-classified-fraud-madras-hc-read-order/
https://www.livelaw.in/mere-incorrect-averment-affidavit-cannot-classified-fraud-madras-hc-read-order/
that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all
, notwithstanding the fact that it is against the State or a private party and
that it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court.
“The law of contempt is not made for the protection of
judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed
to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.” [ Douglas, J.,
Craig v. Harney, 331 US 367, 376 (1947)]
Scandalising the court is one of them. “There are many kinds
of contempts. The chief forms of contempt are insult to Judges, attacks upon
them, comment on pending proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair trial,
obstruction to officers of courts, witnesses or the parties, abusing the
process of the court, breach of duty by officers connected with the court and
scandalising the Judges or the courts. The last form occurs, generally
speaking, when the conduct of a person tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. In this conduct are
included all acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which
offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority. Such
contempt may be committed in respect of a Single Judge or a single court but
may, in certain circumstances, be committed in respect of the whole of the
judiciary or judicial system.”6
C.S.Karnan ( 2017) 7 SCC 1 it is ruled as under ;
High Court Judge disobeying Supreme Court direction and
abusing process of court sentenced to six months imprisonment.
The Commission then referred to the Supreme Court judgments
of Union of India v. Sandur
Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337 and S.Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic
Mission, (2009) 10 SCC 464,
wherein it was held that the power of review cannot be exercised solely on
basis that the parties do not agree with the view of the judgment, as long as
the point is already dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to
challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is
possible under review jurisdiction. Under the review jurisdiction, rehearing of
issues is not allowed but the same issues can be decided just by a perusal of
the records and if a prima
facie error is detected then it can be corrected using the
review jurisdiction. In the instant case, the error was apparent only with respect
to certain complainants.
Criminal
* the allegations were not sufficient to constitute an offence under the said
section, the proceedings against the petitioner were quashed [Chethan
v. State, Crl. Petition No. 5185 of 2017, order dated 7.2.2018] Karnataka High Court
High Court Has Duty To Protect
Honest Businessmen From Those Who Use Unscrupulous Means To Cheat : Calcutta HC
[Read Order]
Article 225 of the Constitution preserved the jurisdiction,
including inherent jurisdiction which existed on the date when the Constitution
came into force, and accordingly, the High Court is the repository of power
enabling it to reach its arms to do justice. Such being the case, I am of the
view that the High Court has a duty to use its inherent powers, in appropriate
cases for the ends of justice, equity and good conscience. Furthermore, in the
commercial world of today it is the duty
of the High Court to protect the honest businessman against persons who use
unscrupulous means to cheat such a businessman. Failure to do so, would
amount to eroding the confidence of the citizens in the High Court. (The
Hon’ble Justice Shekhar B. Saraf G.A. No. 725 of 2019 With C.S. No. 50 of 2019
Tata Chemicals Ltd. Versus M/S Kshitish Bardhan Chunilal Nath and Others WITH
G.A. No. 733 of 2019 With C.S. 51 of 2019 Tata Chemicals Ltd. Versus Ashok
Kumar Saha & Anr.)
We
cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already
noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy
Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, 1997 (6) SCC 450, observing :-
“32. When
a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement
of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for
the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled
decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the
settled legal position. Such judicial
adventurism cannot be permitted
and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not
applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which
necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one
of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.”
In the mater of
Authorized Officer , State Bank of Travancore and Ors. Vs. Mathew K.C. 2018 (3)
SCC 85 , where Honb’le Supreme Court ruled as under ;
“JUDICIAL ADVENTURISM
BY HIGH COURT –PASSING ORDER BY IGNORING LAW SETTLED BY COURT ”
It is duty of the court to apply the correct law even if not
raised by the party.
If any order against
settled law is to be passed then it can be done only by a reasoned order.
Interest Of Victim And Society At Large Must
Also Be Kept In View While Sentencing: SC [Read Judgment]
"The courts must not only keep in view the right of
the accused, but must also keep in view the interest of the victim and society
at large. The courts have been consistent in approach that a reasonable
proportion has to be maintained between the gravity of the offence and the
punishment. While it is true that the sentence imposed upon the accused should
not be harsh, inadequacy of sentence may lead to sufferance of the victim and
the community at large." In
Suryakant Baburao @ Ramrao Phad vs. State of Maharashtra, IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1161 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.8894 of 2018) SURYAKANT BABURAO @ RAMRAO PHAD
...Appellant VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS
In State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh (2015) 3 SCC 441, the
Supreme Court in para (16) held as under:- “16. ……. undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to
the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law.
It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the
nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The
sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances
bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate
with the gravity of the offence. The court must not only keep in view the
rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while
considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. Meagre sentence imposed
solely on account of lapse of time without considering the degree of the
offence will be counterproductive in the long run and against the interest of
the society.”
Having carefully considered the
submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having
examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid
decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a
decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent
Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt
the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In
case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the
attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for
hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come
up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co- equal strength to
express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier
Bench of co- equal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing
before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the
decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two
exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief
Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any
particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any
strength; and
(ii) In spite of the rules laid down
hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of
larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a
Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or
reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons it
may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous
decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the
order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the
situation in Raghubir Singh & Ors. and Hansoli Devi & Ors.(supra).
Supreme Court of India
Central Board Of Dawoodi Bohra ... vs State
Of Maharashtra & Anr on 17 December, 2004
Author: R.C.Lahoti
Bench: R.C.Lahoti Cji, S.V.Patil,
K.G.Balakrishnan, B.N.Srikrishna, A.K.Mathur
CASE NO.:
Writ Petition (civil) 740 of 1986
It held, citing the Supreme Court’s judgment in Delhi
Judicial Service Association’s case that the Supreme Court and the high court,
being the court of record, shall have the powers as well as the duty to protect
the authority and dignity of courts.
Citing another case, R.L. Kapur v
State of Madras (1972), the division
bench of the high court held that under Article 215 of the Constitution, the
high court as a court of record possesses inherent power and jurisdiction,
which is a special one, not arising or derived from Contempt of Courts Act and the
provisions of Section 3 of 1926 Act. t was specifically held in that case that
under Article 215 of the Constitution, no law made by a legislature could take
away the jurisdiction conferred on the high court nor it could confer it afresh
by virtue of its own authority. The high court, therefore, held that it has got
wide inherent power to punish for contempt not only of subordinate courts, but
of the high court itself.
“The objective of the contempt proceedings is not to punish a contemner
for insult of a particular judge, but for saving the dignity of the judicial
system. In case the punishment is not awarded to a person, who by his
publication scandalises and lowers the authority of not only the Court but has
lowered the authority of the judiciary in the eyes of general public…the faith
of the general public in the judiciary will be shattered,” the high court had
held in its order.
The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Harjinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and
others, reported in (1985) 1 SCC 422 has held as follows:
5. ...
... ... On April 7, 1984 the appellant filed an application that as the
prosecution versions in the police challan case and the complaint case were
conflicting and the number of accused and the prosecution witnesses were also
different, the trial of the two cases may not be held together. While this
application was pending, the respondents made an application on April 24, 1984
that the police challan case and the complaint case be consolidated and clubbed
together. That application of theirs was allowed by the learned Additional
Judge who by his order dated April 24, 1984 directed that the cases
may be clubbed and
consolidated and the evidence recorded in one case be read as evidence in the
other case.
AS PER ASSIGNMENT The Supreme Court has held in A.H. Ansari &
others Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad [1997 (11) SCC 230] that the
Judges of the High Court are required to hear the matter assigned to him by the
Hon'ble Chief Justice. They cannot entertain the matters on their own in
respect of which jurisdiction has not been assigned to them, and if any such
judgments are made exceeding their assignment the appellate court can take
cognizance and scrutinize the judgment.
Vide A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531:
“To err is human. Courts including the apex one are
no exception. To own up the mistake when
judicial satisfaction is reached does not militate against
its status or authority. Perhaps it would enhance both.”
P
65……..Most importantly, on neither occasion did the High Court indicate the
slightest of reasons or any application of mind as to why it endorsed the
findings of the inquiry officer or rejected the contentions of the appellant or
even why such a harsh of punishment was called for in the circumstances. After
all, it was also the finding of the inquiry officer that there was no evidence
of the appellant having entered the motorman's cabin on any other occasion.
P 72. FMA 26 of 2019 is allowed as above with costs assessed at Rs.1
lakh to be paid by the High Court to the appellant. Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side)Mintu Mallick vs The Hon'Ble High Court At
Calcutta ... on 4 July, 2019
Common sense –
first principle
Menka GandhiVs. Union of India, (1978) article
21 In Maneka Gandhi vs the Union of India (1978
AIR SC 597), the apex court
held that the "procedure" under Article 21 had to be fair, just and
reasonable, and would have to be also tested with Article 14 (equality) and 19
(the freedoms) thereby ushering in the era of "substantive due
process".
·
State
of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal
·
Citation: Bhajan Lal: State of
Haryana and Others Versus. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335; 1992 Cri LJ 527= AIR 1992 SC 604 [Full PDF Judgment]
Extract From The Judgment
6. The investigation of an offence is the field
exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are
unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is
legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under
Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the
track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their
legal bounds. A noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code
is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation
but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to
direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police
officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally
exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing
serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then
the Court, on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any
grievance has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass
appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the
mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our
Constitution. No one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim
unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable upto unfathomable cosmos.
Any recognition of ï7 3 Power’ which no authority on earth can enjoy.
The Supreme Court of India
in Justice KS Puttaswamy (RETD)
vs Union of India and Ors WP (C) 494/2012 has declared that
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes within it a Right to Privacy.
SC:Findings must be based on facts - HC erred -
order set aside - Existence of Debt or Liability of Accused in the offence u/s.
138 of N. I. Act.
Concurrent findings of two Courts
below that cheque contained signature of Accused and was given to Complainant
to present in the Bank. Presumption u/s. 139 raised. No evidence led to rebut
the presumption. Accused even did not come in Witness Box to support his case.
Only defence taken in Reply to Notice that the Cheque was stolen by the
Complainant. Rejected by two Courts below. No contrary views expressed by
Revisional Court. Finding of Revisional Court that Accused has been successful
in creating doubt in mind of Court with regard to existence of Debt or
Liability, held erroneous.
Case:
Kishan Rao Vs. Shankargouda
Citation:
2018 ALL SCR (Cri) 1197
SC:Mere summary
disposal of a Special Leave Petition does not conclude the issue on merits.
It is true that the
exercise of power under aforesaid Article 226(2) of the Regulations by the very
same Committee did not meet with the
approval, and the Division Bench in certain cases did reject the plea of the
State Government, and affirmed the orders passed by the Single Judge setting
aside the orders of compulsory retirement. It is also true that in those
matters Special Leave Petitions were dismissed summarily. However, it is well
settled that mere summary disposal of a Special Leave Petition does not
conclude the issue on merits.
Case:
M/s Rup Diamonds and
others Vs. Union of India & Ors .
Citation:
(1989) 2 SCC 356 para
8.
Reiterated in:
2019 (5) Supreme 227
SC
SC orders 5 Lakhs
compensation for arrests without following prescribed procedure u/s. 41 and
41-A of Cr.P.C.
Arrest
of two ladies, one Doctor and another an Advocate, in an offence registered
u/s. 420/34 IPC, without following the due procedure as prescribed u/s. 41 and
41-A of Cr.P.C., it jeopardized their dignity and liberty, state directed to
pay compensation of Rs. 5 Lakhs each.
Case:
Dr.
Rini Johar and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. and Ors.
Citation:
Writ
Petition(Criminal) No. 30 of 2015.
Bench
/ Judges:
Dipak
Mishra and Shiva Kirti Singh
Decided
by Supreme Court on 30/06/2016. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103942103/
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1951858/ It
is settled position or law that the High Court in exercise of this inherent
power in wider sense possesses :-
(a)
the power to pass an order which may be necessary to give effect to any order
under this Code;
(b)
the power, using as a sheild, to prevent the abuse of the process of the court;
(c)
the power to secure the ends of Justice and ; (d) finally the ultimate power to
perform the real and substantial justice.
But
defination is only to be found in the code of Civil Procedure. Section 2(9) of
the CPC defined judgment as follows :-
"
'Judgment' means the statement given by the Judge on the ground of a decree or
order. In Black's Law Dictionary 'judgment' has been defined as follows :-
"Judgment.
A sense of knowledge sufficient to comprehend nature of transaction.
The
information of an opinion or notion concerning something by exercising the mind
upon it.
The
official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the respective
rights and claims of the parties to an action or suit therein litigated and
submitted to its determination."
In another case of Janha Das v. Daitari Chandra
Pattanaik reported in (1991) 4 Orissa Criminal Report-484, the Orissa High
Court held that the dismissal of the criminal Revision for default was neither
a judgment nor a final order and such order is administrative in nature rather
than a judicial order and as such, Section 362 is not be a bar to restoration of
the criminal revision. In paragraph-3 of the said judgment the Court held as
follows:
In Indirect Tax Association Vs. R.
K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281, it
is ruled by Hon‟ble Supreme Court that; ―Judge have their
accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by their
conscience and oath of their office, that is to defend and uphold the Constitution and the
laws without fear and favor with malice towards none, with charity for all, we
strive to do the right.‖
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Davinder
Pal Singh Bhullar‟s Case (2011) 14 SCC 770 had observed as under; ―It is a myth that the Judges, taking the oath of office as a
judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections,
becomes a passionless thinking machine.”
In “Madhav Hayawadanrao
Hoskot vs. State of Maharashtra; (1978) 3 SCC 544” Justice Shri V.R.
Krishna Iyer reproduced the well-known words of Mr. Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. and held as under:
“16. Nothing rankles more
in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. 4
…Democracy’s very life depends upon
making the machinery of justice so effective that every citizen shall believe
in and benefit by its impartiality and fairness. The social service which the
Judges render to the community is the removal of a sense / fear of injustice
from the hearts of people, which unfortunately is not being done, and the
people (victims & dejected litigants) have been left abandoned to suffer
and bear their existing painful conditions, and absolutely on the mercy of
GOD.”
Hon‟ble Uttaranchal High Court
in Laxman Singh Rana Vs. Jagdish in C-482 No. 1014486/ 2015 vide
order dated 8th December, 2015 it is ruled as under;
―As per the mandate of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, every litigant should be given equal
treatment. Ordinarily, no case / suit should be directed to be decided by the Trial Court out of turn, unless, of course,
there are compelling circumstances to do so.‖ Similar law
is followed in Ishk Lal Vs. Avodh Bihari Mittal in WPMS No. 2210 of
2015 vide order dated 8 September, 2015 it is read as under;
―As per mandate of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, every litigant should be given equal treatment &
ordinarily, no case should be directed to be decided out of turn, on priority
basis unless, of course, there are compelling circumstances to do so.
Undisputedly, there are so many appeals, which were filed prior to the appeal,
in question, which are still pending and waiting for their turn. I do not find
any compelling circumstance justifying out of turn hearing of the appeal.‖
Joinder
of causes of action - Several causes of action can be joined against
same defendant or same defendants jointly - There cannot be joinder of causes
of action when there are different set of defendants who have different causes
of actions. (2019(1) Apex Court Judgments 424 (S.C.)
Head
note by
Chander
Mohan
Advocate
7814266184
The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton,
L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT
136 in the following words:
"[I]t has been for
many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the
greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to
obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair
disclosure of all the material facts- it says facts, not law. He
must not misstate the law if he can help it; the Court is
supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing
about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and
the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is
that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it
the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the
faith of the imperfect statement".
DELETE
LINES FROM ORDER
When
the question arises before the High Court in any specific case whether to
resort to such undefined power it is essential for it to exercise great caution
and circumspection. Thus when it is moved by an aggrieved party to expunge any
passage from the order or judgment of a subordinate Court it must be fully
satisfied that the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and
unjustifiable, that its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the
person to whom it refers and that its expunction
will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order.
Courts
Can Interfere With Administrative Actions Only If It Suffers From Vice Of
Illegality, Irrationality Or Procedural Impropriety: SC
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/judicial-review-of-administrative-decisions-148169
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/judicial-review-of-administrative-decisions-148169
CIVIL
APPEAL Nos.73197320 OF 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 172173 of
2019)
MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL NEEMUCH .... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MAHADEO
REAL ESTATE AND ORS. .... RESPONDENT(S)
It could thus be seen that
the scope of judicial review of
an administrative action is
very limited. Unless the Court comes
to a conclusion, that the
decision maker has not understood the
law correctly that regulates
his decision making power or when
it is found that the decision
of the decision maker is vitiated by
irrationality and that too on
the principle of “Wednesbury
Unreasonableness” or unless it
is found that there has been a
procedural impropriety in the
decisionmaking process, it would
not be permissible for the High
Court to interfere in the decision
making process. It is also
equally well settled, that it is not
permissible for the Court to
examine the validity of the decision
but this Court can examine only
the correctness of the decision
making process.
17.It could thus be seen
that an interference by the High
Court would be warranted only
when the decision impugned is
vitiated by an apparent error
of law, i.e., when the error is
apparent on the face of the
record and is self evident. The High
Court would be empowered to
exercise the powers when it finds
that the decision impugned is
so arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person would have
ever arrived at. It has been
reiterated that the test is not
what the court considers
reasonable or unreasonable but
a decision which the court
thinks that no reasonable
person could have taken. Not only
this but such a decision must
have led to manifest injustice.
GROUND THAT CHARGE
OF DISOBEDIENCE OF THE ORDERS OF THE HIGHE R AUTHORIT Y UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO……………/2010
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) NO. 19318/2007)
Mohd.
Yunus Khan ... Appellant
Versus
State
of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1.
Leave granted.
The
facts of the present case reveal that a person who initiated
the
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for disobeying his
own
orders; appointed his subordinate as an inquiry officer; appeared
as
a witness in the proceedings to prove the charges of disobedience
of
his orders; accepted the enquiry report; and further passed the order
of
punishment - i.e. dismissal of the appellant from service. The
1
proper opportunity of
hearing to the appellant. The High Court failed to consider that, in a case where
there had been a violation of the statutory provisions, or principles of
natural
justice, power of judicial review required to be exercised. The
appeal deserves to be allowed.
Punishment for misconduct can be
imposed in consonance with
the statutory rules and principles of
natural
justice. (See Bachhittar Singh v. State of
Punjab & Anr.,
AIR
1963 SC 395; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364;
Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1121;
Moni Shankar v. Union of India & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 484; and
Union of India & Ors. v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC
541).
16.
Our
Constitution protects not only the life and liberty
but
also the dignity of every person. Life convicts and hardcore
criminals
deprived of personal liberty are also not wholly denuded of
their
Constitutional rights. Arbitrariness is an anathema to the
principles
of reasonableness and fairness enshrined in our
constitutional
provisions. The rule of law prohibits the exercise of
power
in an arbitrary manner and/or in a manner that travels beyond
the
boundaries of reasonableness. Thus, a statutory authority is not
permitted
to act whimsically/arbitrarily. Its actions should be guided
by
the principles of reasonableness and fairness. The authority cannot
be permitted to abuse the law or to use
it unfairly.
The
legal maxim “nemo debet esse judex in propria
causa” (no
man
shall be a judge in his own cause) is required to be observed by
all
judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as non-observance thereof is
treated
as a violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide
Secretary to Government, Transport Department v.
Munuswamy
Mudaliar & Anr.,
AIR 1988 SC 2232; Meenglas Tea Estate v.
The Workmen, AIR
1963 SC 1719; and Mineral Development Ltd.
v. The State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 468).
This
Court in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of
Gujarat &
Anr., (2009)
11 SCC 84, placed reliance upon the judgment in Ashok
Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC
417,
and held that no person should
adjudicate a dispute which he or
she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this
principle
creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said
person.
Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case
wherein
he is interested. The question is not whether the person is
actually
biased but whether the circumstances are such as to create a
reasonable
apprehension in the minds of others that there is a
likelihood of bias affecting the
decision.
An
order in violation of the principles of natural justice may be
void
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide Raja
Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of
Direct
Taxes & Ors., AIR
1975 SC 1816; Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India & Anr., AIR
1978 SC 597; Krishan Lal v. State of J & K,
(1994)
4 SCC 422; State Bank of Patiala & Ors.
v. S.K. Sharma,
AIR
1996 SC 1669; Union of India & Anr. v. M/s.
Mustafa &
Najibai Trading Co. & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2526; and Vishnu
Dutt
& Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2005) 13 SCC 592). “Principles of natural
justice
are to some minds burdensome but this price-a small price
indeed-has
to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of
law.”
As
the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of
natural justice as well
IMPORTANT ORDERs & RULEs
IN Civil Procedure Code :----
1) To delete/Add parties ORDER 1 RULE 10.
2) Amendment of Suit to add
defendants ORDER 1 RULE 10(4)
3) Substitute service ORDER 5 RULE 20
4) Amendment of pleadings
ORDER 6 RULE 17
5) Additional W.S ORDER 8 RULE
9
6) Setting aside exparte
order ORDER 9RULE 7
7) Restoration ORDER 9 RULE
9
8) Setaside exparte decree
ORDER 9 RULE 13
9) To order production of
documents ORDER 11 RULE 14
11) Inspection of documents
ORDER 11 RULE 15
12) To produce documents ORDER 12 RULE 8
13) Production of
documents ORDER 7 RULE 14(3)
14) To return unmarked
documents ORDER 13 RULE 7(2)
15) To return marked
Documents Order 13 RULE 9
16) Adjournment order 17
RULE 1
17) Recalling witness order
18 RULE 17
18) To grant installments
after decree passed ORDER 20 RULE
11(2)
19) Stay of execution ORDER 21 RULE 26
20) Delivery of immovable
property ORDER 21RULE 35
21) To Break open door ORDER 21 RULE 35(3)
22) Attachments of movables
of JDRs ORDER 21RULE 43
23) Attachments of Payorders
of JDRs ORDER 21RULE 45(1)
24) Attachment of salary of
JDRs ORDER 21 RULE 48
25) Attachment of Immovable
property of JDRs ORDER 21 RULE 54
26) Sale of attached
property ORDER 21 RULE 64
27) Adjournment/stoppage of
sale ORDER 21RULE 69
28) Delivery of movable
property ORDER 21 RULE 9
29) To bring L.Rs on record
incase of death of Plaintiff ORDER 22
RULE 3
30) To bring L.Rs on record
incase of death of Defendant ORDER
22RULE 4
31) For Compromise ORDER 23 RULE 3
32) Appointment of
commissioner to examine witness ORDER
26 RULE 1
33) *Appointment of
commissioner to make local investigation" ORDER 26 RULE 9
34) Appointment of
commissioner to examine adjust A/Cs
ORDER 26 RULE 11
35) Appointment of
commissioner to make partition of immovable property ORDER 26 RULE 13
36) Disclose partners
names ORDER 30RULE 2
37) Appointment of guardian
for minors ORDER 33RULE 1
38) Removal of guardian ORDER 32 RULE 9
39) To declare as major ORDER 32 RULE 12
40) Appointment of guardian
of an unsound person ORDER 32 RULE 15
41) Attachment before
judgment ORDER 38 RULE 5
42) Appointment of
receiver ORDER 40 RULE 1
43) Regular appeal ORDER 41 RULE 1
44) Stay of execution of
decree in appeal ORDER 41 RULE 5(1)
45) Restore of appeal
dismissed for default ORDER 41 RULE 19
46) Production of additional
evidence in appeal ORDER 41 RULE 27
47) Second appeal ORDER 42 RULE 1
48) Review of Judgment ORDER
47 RULE 1
49) Advancement RULE 109(2)
50) Third party for
C.Cs RULE188(2)
51) Amendment of
Judgments/decrees/orders ORDER Sec.152
52)
To summon doctor for evidence (Handover summons) ORDER 16 RULE 7(4).
It
is well-settled that
an
executing court cannot travel beyond the order or decree
under
execution (see Rameshwar Dass Gupta v. State of
U.P.
and Another, (1996) 5 SCC 728). IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7800 OF 2014
S.
Bhaskaran ...Appellant(s) Versus Sebastian (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors.
...Respondent(s)
"A Judge Is Also Judged By the Quality And
Purity of His Character", SC Upholds Dismissal Of Magistrate Who Passed
Favourable Orders For A Lady Lawyer
In this case, the officer decided the cases because of his proximate relationship with a lady lawyer and not because the law required him to do so. This is also gratification of a different kind.. The Judicial Officer concerned did not live upto the expectations of integrity, behavior and probity expected of him. His conduct is as such that no leniency can be shown and he cannot be visited with a lesser punishment.
In this case, the officer decided the cases because of his proximate relationship with a lady lawyer and not because the law required him to do so. This is also gratification of a different kind.. The Judicial Officer concerned did not live upto the expectations of integrity, behavior and probity expected of him. His conduct is as such that no leniency can be shown and he cannot be visited with a lesser punishment.
The
bench observed that a judge must decide
the case only on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the
case. If a judge decides a case for
any extraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty in accordance with
law, it added.
The
first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity. The need of
integrity in the judiciary is much higher than in other institutions. The
judiciary is an institution whose foundations are based on honesty and
integrity. It is, therefore, necessary that judicial officers should possess
the sterling quality of integrity.The behavior of a Judge has to of an exacting
standard, both inside and outside the Court.
Judges are also public servants. A Judge
should always remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judged
not only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality and purity of his
character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected both in public and personal
life of a Judge. One who stands in judgments over others should be
incorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected of Judges
Judges
must remember that they are not merely employees but hold high public office
and that the standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that
of an ordinary person.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7306 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 33818/2015)
SHRIRANG YADAVRAO WAGHMARE APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
RESPONDENT(S)
The
Supreme Court has reiterated that while exercising its powers of judicial
review of administrative action, Courts could not interfere with the
administrative decision unless it suffers from the vice of illegality,
irrationality or procedural impropriety
The
scope of judicial review of an administrative action is very limited. Unless
the Court comes to a conclusion, that the decision maker has not understood the
law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when it is found that
the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on
the principle of "Wednesbury Unreasonableness" or unless it is found
that there has been a procedural impropriety in the decision-making process, it
would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the decision making
process. It is also equally well settled, that it is not permissible for the
Court to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can examine only
the correctness of the decision-making process.
An
interference by the High Court would be warranted only when the decision
impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law, i.e., when the error is
apparent on the face of the record and is self evident. The High Court would be
empowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the decision impugned is so
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would have ever arrived at.
It has been reiterated that the test is not what the court considers reasonable
or unreasonable but a decision which the court thinks that no reasonable person
could have taken. Not only this but such a decision must have led to manifest
injustice.
In
facts of the case, the bench observed that the decision of the State Government
or the Commissioner could not be termed as illegal, improper, unreasonable or
irrational. The bench also said that the decision of the Commissioner which is
undoubtedly in larger public interest, which would ensure that the Municipal
Council earns a higher revenue by enlarging the scope of the competition
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL
APPEAL Nos.73197320 OF 2019
(Arising
out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 172173 of 2019)
MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL NEEMUCH .... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MAHADEO
REAL ESTATE AND ORS. .... RESPONDENT(S)
Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan,
( (2016) 8 SCC 509 ) has held that access of justice is an integral part of the guarantee
contained in Article 21 and 14 of
the Constitution of India which guarantees equality before law and equal
protection of law to not only citizens but non-citizens also.
xxx xxx xxx 8.7. Making false averment in the
pleading pollutes the stream of justice. It is an attempt at inviting the Court
into passing a wrong judgment and that is why it must be treated as an offence.
RECALL For Order
Beyond the scope of
pleading…….which is impermissible and unwarranted .
Sub para: “ ….. “ but court has observed . no way
stated has approval
Sub : go beyond SC judgement
……….. order should be recalled . respondent has supported the petitioner ,
beyond the scope of pleading .
Court should apply the mind
on pleading . sacared documents on
record. Abuse of position and power, abuse of the process of court by the
court. If a
subordinate court commits an abuse of
the process of the Court, a superior court has
the power, nay the duty to prevent the said abuse becoming
perpetual by interfering with the proceeding. https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/93284/?formInput=abuse%20of%20the%20process%20of%20court%20by%20the%20court
Counter has annexed the
documents which are fabricated …….mislead
Criminal contempt mislead
statement SC order agarwal or CRPC 340 .
Misprepresented the fact .
Shy lock story by
shakesphere……
13. The
learned Single Judge has concluded that the Arbitrator, in formulating, during
the course of the final award, an additional issue whether the deduction was
neither LD nor a penalty, has travelled beyond the scope of
the reference and pleadings and written submissions of the parties.
Delhi High Court Engineers India Limited vs Tema India Limited
on 7 January, 2016
Even there
was no pleading by the respective parties on that score, as it
appears from the pleadings. It is settled legal position that the
Court is bound to proceed on the basis of the pleading and
cannot travel beyond the pleading save and
except in some exceptional cases where the writ Court may consider that any
point is required to be adjudicated and to that effect Court may frame that
question and may direct the person concerned to answer that issue. Reliance may
be placed to the judgement passed in the case Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority -Vs.- S.Vasudeva reported in 2000(2) SCC.439 where it was
held that Court should not travel beyond the scope of
the writ petition and/or beyond the pleading therein.
On the point that the Court may frame a new question and may answer that point
by giving an opportunity of hearing is also the view decided by the Apex Court
in the case V.K.Majotra -Vs.- Union of India reported in 2003(8) SCC. 40
whereby the Court held that additional point not pleaded, could be
raised by the writ Court, subject to providing of an opportunity of hearing to
the affected parties, but such power should be exercised in rarest of rare
cases and when fact and circumstances require such adjudication. Even in the
case Som Mittal -Vs.- Government of Karnataka reported in 2008(3) SCC.574, a
judgement of three Judges' Bench, the Court held that when there is necessity
to decide or comment upon the issue not raised by the party, the Court may do
so after inviting the parties so that they may put forward the views on such
issue. Judgement Passed In The Case The ... vs
T.R.Challappan Reported In Air ... on 30 June, 2009 calcutta HC , https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/189887145/?formInput=Beyond%20the%20scope%20of%20pleading
It is well
settled that since the principle of promissory estoppels is based on equitable
principles, a person who obtains appointment by misrepresenting his educational
qualification cannot be permitted to invoke the principle of promissory
estoppel when his appointment is cancelled because of such misrepresentation.
Reliance in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of Central Airmen Selection Board Vs. Surender Kumar Das reported in
2003(1)SCC 152.
S. K. Sarkar, Member,
Board Of ... vs Vinay Chandra Misra on 12 December, 1980
Equivalent citations:
1981 AIR 723, 1981 SCR (2) 331
Article 215 of the Constitution provides : "Every High Court shall
be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself."
Entry
14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is to this effect : "Contempt of
Court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court." A provision
analogous to Article 215 is Article 129 which preserves to the Supreme Court all the powers of a
Court of Record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Entry 77
of List I of the Seventh Schedule is relatable to Article 129.
Articles
129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court,
respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power to punish the
contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. The State of U.P., there are no curbs on the power of the
High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and 215 do not define as to what constitutes
contempt of court. Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid Entries in List I
and List III of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and limit the powers of
the courts in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their procedure in
relating thereto. Indeed, this is what is stated in the Preamble of the Act of
1971.
Section 2(c) of the Act defines `criminal contempt". Section 9 emphasises
that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that
any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of
court which would not be so punishable apart from this Act". Section 10 runs
as under :
"Every High Court shall have and exercise
the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same
procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as
it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself."
Then,
there is a proviso which is not material for our purpose. The provision
in Section 10 is but a replica of Section 3 of
the 1952 Act. The phrase "courts subordinate to it" used in Section 10 is
wide enough to include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the High
Court, even though administrative control over them under Article 235 of
the Constitution does not vest in the High Court. Under Article 227 of
the Constitution the High Court has the power of superintendence over all
courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant
case, is a court "subordinate to the High Court" within the contemplation
of Section 10 of the Act.
Section 14 provides for the procedure where contempt is committed in
the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 is
very material for our purpose. It provides in regard to cognizance of `criminal
contempt' in cases other than those falling under Section 14.
The material portion of Section 15 reads
thus :
"(1) In the case of a criminal contempt,
other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court
may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by-
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing
of the Advocate-General.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a
subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by
the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in
relation to a Union Territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf............."
The
operation of sub-section (1) appears to be confined to cases of `criminal
contempt' of the Supreme Court or the High Court, itself. Criminal contempt of
a subordinate court is dealt with in sub-section (2).
7. Mr.
Jethmalani also urged that even Rule 6 of the aforesaid Rules had not been
followed, as notices have not been issued to the respondents in Form 1, as
prescribed and the proceedings were, therefore, liable to be discontinued
on such ground as well.
8. In
support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Jethmalani referred to and relied
upon the decision of this Court in P.N. Duda vs. P. Shiv Shanker & Ors. [(1988) 3 SCC 167], in which the
provisions of Section 15(1)(a) and (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Explanation (a) and Rule 3(a),
(b)
and (c) of the Contempt of Supreme Court Rules, 1975, had been considered in
paragraphs 53 and 54 of the judgment. It was pointed out that a direction had
been given by this Court that if any information was lodged even in the form of
a petition inviting this Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215 of the Constitution, where the informant is not one of the
persons named in Section 15 of the said Act, it should not be styled as a petition and
should not be placed for admission on the judicial side. On the other
hand, such a petition was required to be placed before the Chief Justice for
orders in Chambers and the Chief Justice could decide, either by himself or in
consultation with the other judges of the Court, whether to take any cognizance
of the information. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that since, despite the aforesaid
direction, the application filed by the Amicus Curiae had been placed before the
Court in its judicial side, the same was not maintainable on such score as well
and the proceedings were liable to be discontinued on such ground also.
9. Mr.
Jethmalani also referred to the decision of this Court in Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute & Ors. [(2005) 1 SCC 254], wherein in the
absence of the consent of the Advocate General in respect of a contempt
petition filed by a private party under Section 15 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, without a prayer for taking suo motu action of
contempt, was held to be not maintainable.
10.
Mr. Jethmalani urged that the power vested in the High Courts and the Supreme
Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was a regulatory measure imposing
a fetter on a citizen's fundamental right to freedom of speech and would have
to be invoked and exercised with utmost caution so as not to infringe upon such
fundamental right. Any deviation from the prescribed Rules should not be
accepted or condoned lightly and must be deemed to be fatal to the proceedings
taken to initiate action for contempt.
11.
Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate, who appeared for Respondent No.2,
while reiterating the submissions made by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, laid special
stress on the decision in Duda's case (supra) and reiterated the directions
given in such case to the effect that the application made by the Amicus
Curiae could have been placed only before the Chief Justice in Chambers on the
administrative side and not on the judicial side. Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted
that in matters such as this, the reputation of the Court had to be considered
and in view of the deviation from the normal procedure, which was meant to be
strictly adhered to, the contempt proceedings and notice issued on the
aforesaid application, were liable to be dropped.
The error
committed by the Registry of the Supreme Court in placing the matter on the
judicial side instead of placing the same before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of
India on the administrative side, is an administrative lapse which does
not reduce the gravity of the allegations. Even in Duda's case (supra) and more
explicitly in Bal Thackrey's case, it has been indicated by this Court that it
could have taken suo motu cognizance, had the petitioners prayed for it, even
without the consent of the Attorney General, but that such a recourse should be
confined to rare occasions only.
Thus, on
prima facie satisfaction that there were sufficient grounds for taking action
on its own motion, the Court initiated suo motu action by directing issue of
notice to the Respondents. Hence, the present contempt proceeding was initiated
by the Court on its own motion and it is not covered by clauses (a), (b)
and (c) of sub- section (1) of Section 15 of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971
or clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 3 of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for
Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975. On the other hand, the present proceeding
is covered by clause (a) of rule 3 of the said Rules. Merely because the
information regarding the allegedly contemptuous statements made by Respondent
No.1 and published by Respondent No.2 was furnished to the Court by the learned
Amicus Curiae, the proceeding cannot lose its nature or character as a suo motu
proceeding. The learned Amicus Curiae was entitled to place the information in
his possession before the court and request the court to take action. The
petition filed by him constituted nothing more than a mode of laying the
relevant information before the court for such action as the court may deem
fit. No proceedings can commence until and unless the court considers the
information before it and decides to initiate proceedings. If the court
considers the information placed before it and initiates proceedings by
directing notice to issue to the alleged contemnors the action taken comes
within the ambit of Rule 3(a) of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt
of the Supreme Court, 1975.
189Th Report On Revison
Of Court Fee,LAW COMMISSION OF
INDIA 189TH REPORT,ON REVISION
OF COURT FEES STRUCTURE FEBRUARY,
2004
CHAPTER IX CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS On the basis of our
discussion in preceding chapters, following conclusions emerge:
1) Right to access to Courts is now recognized as a basic human right and
its origin can be traced to Art. 8 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the United
Nations Organisation in 1948 and to Art. 2 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
which India is a party.
Supreme
Court of India in Joginder Kumar Vs. State of
U.P. and
others2 has held as follows:
“20.
..........No arrest can be made because it is
lawful for
the police officer to do so. The existence of
the power
to arrest is one thing. The justification for
the
exercise of it is quite another. The police officer
must be
able to justify the arrest apart from his power
to do so. Arrest
and detention in police lock-up of a
person can
cause incalculable harm to the reputation
and
self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in
a routine manner on a mere allegation of
commission
of an offence made against a person. It would be
prudent for
a police officer in the interest of protection
of the
constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in
his own
interest that no arrest should be made without
a
reasonable satisfaction reached after some
investigation
as to the genuineness and bona fides of
a complaint
and a reasonable belief both as to the
person's
complicity and even so as to the need to
effect
arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a
serious
matter. The recommendations of the Police
Commission
merely reflect the constitutional
concomitants
of the fundamental right to personal
liberty and
freedom. A person is not liable to arrest
merely on
the suspicion of complicity in an offence.
There must
be some reasonable justification in the
opinion of
the officer effecting the arrest that such
arrest is
necessary and justified. Except in heinous
offences,
an arrest must be avoided if a police officer
issues
notice to person to attend the Station House
and not to
leave the Station without permission would
do.”
This is a
case of blatant violation of
fundamental
right by the Police. Having come to such
conclusion,
mere quashing the FIR shall not mitigate the
agony which
the petitioner was compelled to undergo. In
D.K.Basu
Vs. State of West Bengal3
it is held
that a
Court of
Law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness
to stark
realities by recording thus:
“45. The
old doctrine of only relegating the
aggrieved
to the remedies available in civil law limits
the role of
the courts too much, as the protector and
custodian
of the indefeasible rights of the citizens.
The courts
have the obligation to satisfy the social
aspirations
of the citizens because the courts and the
law are for
the people and expected to respond to
their
aspirations. A court of law cannot close its
consciousness
and aliveness to stark realities. Mere
punishment
of the offender cannot give much solace
to the
family of the victim — civil action for damages
is a long
drawn and a cumbersome judicial process.
Monetary
compensation for redressal by the court
finding the
infringement of the indefeasible right to
life of the
citizen is, therefore, useful and at time
perhaps the
only effective remedy to apply balm to
the wounds
of the family members of the deceased
victim, who
may have been the breadwinner of the
family.”
In Arnesh
Kumar’s case, Hon'ble Supreme
Court of
India has issued directions to ensure that the
Police
Officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily
and
Magistrates do not authorize detention casually and
mechanically.
The said directions read as follows:
“11. Our
endeavour in this judgment is to ensure
that police
officers do not arrest the accused
unnecessarily
and Magistrate do not authorize detention
casually
and mechanically. In order to ensure what we
have
observed above, we give the following directions:
11.1. All
the State Governments to instruct its
police
officers not to automatically arrest when a case
under
Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy
themselves
about the necessity for arrest under the
WWW.LIVELAW.IN
CRL.P.
NO.4306/2019
18
parameters
laid down above flowing from Section 41
CrPC;
11.2. All
police officers be provided with a check
list
containing specified sub-clause under section
41(1)(b)(ii);
11.3. The
police officer shall forward the check list
duly filled
and furnish the reasons and materials which
necessitated
the arrest, while forwarding/producing the
accused
before the Magistrate for further detention;
11.4. The
Magistrate while authorizing detention of
the accused
shall peruse the report furnished by the
police
officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording
its
satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;
11.5. The
decision not to arrest an accused, be
forwarded
to the Magistrate within two weeks from the
date of the
institution of the case with a copy to the
Magistrate
which may be extended by the Superintendent
of Police
of the district for the reasons to be recorded in
writing;
11.6.
Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-
A CrPC be
served on the accused within two weeks from
the date of
institution of the case, which may be
extended by
the Superintendent of Police of the district
for the
reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.7.
Failure to comply with the directions
aforesaid
shall apart from rendering the police officers
concerned
liable for departmental action, they shall also
be liable
to be punished for contempt of court to be
instituted
before the High Court having territorial
jurisdiction.
11.8.
Authorising detention without recording
reasons as
aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned
shall be
liable for departmental action by the appropriate
High
Court.”
(Emphasis
Supplied)
(h) The
Registrar General shall take necessary
action for
initiation of Departmental Enquiry
against the
Magistrate as per directions in
WWW.LIVELAW.IN
CRL.P.
NO.4306/2019
21
para 11.8
of Arneshkumar Vs. State of Bihar
and another
(supra).
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS
THE 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2019
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE
MR. JUSTICE P.S. DINESH KUMAR
CRIMINAL
PETITION No.4306 OF 2019
BETWEEN:
SRI.
JAIKANTH S
PETITIONER
(BY SHRI.
ARUNA SHYAM M, ADVOCATE)
AND :
THE STATE
OF KARNATAKA... RESPONDENT
Predisposition To A Particular View Raises
Reasonable Doubt Of Judicial Bias' : Sr Adv Shyam Divan Seeks Justice Mishra's
Recusal
"Bias
may be defined as a pre-conceived opinion or a pre-disposition or
pre-determination to decide a case or an issue in a particular manner, so much
so that such pre-disposition does not leave the mind open to conviction. It is,
in fact, a condition of mind, which sways judgments and renders the Judge
unable to exercise impartiality in a particular case",</i> Divan quoted
from the SC precedent in <b>State of West
Bengal v S Pathak (1998) 5 SCC 513
Actual
existence of bias is not needed for recusal of judges. A reasonable likelihood
of existence of bias affecting perception of judge being impartial is
sufficient for recusal, submitted Divan relying on <b>State of Punjab
v Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 740.
Divan quotes Para 5 of Narinder Singh Arora v
State (2012) 1 SCC 561 to state what constitutes bias
Divan quotes Para 12 of Narinder Singh Arora
v State (2012) 1 SCC 561 to state likelihood is bias is a ground for recusal
The cardinal principle is justice must not only
be done, but also seen to be done.
It
was submitted that besides the maxim justice delayed is justice denied there
is other judicial maxim justice hurried is justice buried
which applies to the facts of the present case
Learned
counsel for the petitioner laid emphasis on the maxim „justice hurried
is justice buried' but there is another maxim „justice delayed is justice denied."
Quick and prompt trial of criminal offences is the need of the hour to repose
faith of the people in judiciary.
The right to speedy trial is
implicit in Art.21 of
the constitution of India. The first written articulation of the right to
speedy trial appeared in 1215 in the Magna Carta: "We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or
right." Article
21 of the Indian constitution declares that "no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
the procedure laid by law." Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer
in Babu
Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1978 SC 527 remarked, "Our justice system
even in grave cases, suffers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal to „fair
trial‟ whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is
a component of social justice since the community, as a whole,
is concerned in the criminal being condignly and finally punished within a
reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of
criminal proceedings." Shiv
Kumar Yadav vs State on 4 March, 2015Delhi High Court
The anxiety of all concerned about quick dispensation of justice has
been succinctly stated by one of us (Hon'ble Justice Kirpal)
in All India Judges Association & Ors. v. Union
of India & Ors. (JT 2002
[3] SC 503) in the following words:
"An independent and efficient judicial system is one of the
basic structures of our Constitution. If sufficient number of judges are not
appointed, justice would not be available to the people,
thereby undermining the basic structure. It is well known that justice delayed is justice denied. Brij Mohan Lal vs Union Of India & Ors on 6 May, 2002
scc
Sedition
Charge For Writing A Letter To PM: My Dear CJM Ji, Ignorance Of Law Is No Excuse!
https://www.livelaw.in/columns/sedition-charge-for-writing-a-letter-to-pm-my-dear-cjm-ji-ignorance-of-law-is-no-excuse-148890
https://www.livelaw.in/columns/sedition-charge-for-writing-a-letter-to-pm-my-dear-cjm-ji-ignorance-of-law-is-no-excuse-148890
"Article 141 of Indian Constitution
says: The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts. It
is called precedent, which is one of the important sources of law for any
democratic nation and such law would bind all the lower courts. As recently as
on September 7, 2016, Supreme Court Bench of Justice Dipak Misra quoted an old
judgment to reassert that 'Someone's statement criticising the government does not
invoke an offence of sedition or defamation.' On May 26, ...
This judgement of Supreme Court in 1962 which was re-enforced in 2016 will bind the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bihar, but it appears the ratio decidendi was totally ignored by him. If he is ignorant of this decision read with Article 141, he should have at least known that 'ignorantia juris non-excusat' i.e., the ignorance of law is no excuse and that law presumes that each knows the law.
This judgement of Supreme Court in 1962 which was re-enforced in 2016 will bind the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bihar, but it appears the ratio decidendi was totally ignored by him. If he is ignorant of this decision read with Article 141, he should have at least known that 'ignorantia juris non-excusat' i.e., the ignorance of law is no excuse and that law presumes that each knows the law.
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Suresh Kumar Kulshrestha
vs M.P.M.K.V.V. Company Ltd. ... on 12 April, 2019
It is
well established principle of law that a mistaken belief about a law is no
defence to a violation of that law. All persons are presumed to know and
understand the law.
Ignorantia
Facti Excusat, Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat, which means ignorance of fact can
be excused, but ignorance of law cannot be excused.
In Anil Rai v. State of Bihar reported in (2001)
7 SCC 318, para 3. any procedure or course of action which does not ensure a
reasonable quick adjudication has been termed to be unjust. Such a course is contrary to
the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' that an act of the Court shall
prejudice none.
Illegal
building navi Mumbai https://indiankanoon.org/doc/150638608/
In the
case of State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, (1975) 4 SCC 428, Mathew, J. eloquently
expressed this proposition in the following words:
"In a government of responsibility like
ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct,
there can be but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know
every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public
functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public
transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the
concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make
one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have
no repercussion on public security. To cover with veil of secrecy, the common
routine business, is not in the interest of the public. Such secrecy can seldom
be legitimately desired. It is generally desired for the purpose of parties and
politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratic routine. The responsibility
of officials to explain and to justify their acts is the chief safeguard
against oppression and corruption."
The case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981
SCC Supp. 87, decided by a seven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court, is
generally considered as having broken new ground and having added a fresh,
liberal dimension to the need for increased disclosure in matters relating to
public affairs. In that case, the consensus that emerged amongst the Judges was
that in regard to the functioning of government, disclosure of information must
be the ordinary rule while secrecy must be an exception, justifiable only when
it is demanded by the requirement of public interest. The Court held that the
disclosure of documents relating to the affairs of State involves two competing
dimensions of public interest, namely, the right of the citizen to obtain
disclosure of information, which competes with the right of the State to
protect the information relating to its crucial affairs. It was further held
that, in deciding whether or not to disclose the contents of a particular document,
a Judge must balance the competing interests and make his final decision
depending upon the particular facts involved in each individual case. It is
important to note that it was conceded that there are certain classes of
documents which are necessarily required to be protected, e.g. Cabinet Minutes,
documents concerning the national safety, documents which affect diplomatic
relations or relate to some State secrets of the highest importance, and the
like in respect of which the Court would ordinarily uphold Government's claim
of privilege. However, even these documents have to be tested against the basic
guiding principle which is that wherever it is clearly contrary to the public
interest for a document to be disclosed, then it is in law immune from disclosure.
(Paras 73 and 74 at pp. 284-286).
Rupa
Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 : AIR 2002 SC 1771
By
majority of 5 : 2 the appeal was allowed and all proceedings in the cases
against the appellant before the High Court pursuant to the said order of the
Constitution Bench dated February 16, 1984, were set aside and quashed.
Mukharji, Oza and Natarajan, JJ. took the view that the earlier order of this
Court dated February 16, 1984 which deprived the appellant of his
constitutional rights, was contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1952 and
was in violation of the principles of natural justice and in the background of
the said Act was without any precedent and that the legal
wrong should be corrected ex debito justitiae Ranganath Misra,J.,
with whom Ray,J., agreed, while concurring with the majority, observed that it
was a duty of the Court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers.
Nevertheless,
we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he
establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a
party to the lis but the judgement adversely affected his interests or, if he
was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and
the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his
connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an
apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner.
Rupa Ashok Hurra v.
Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 : AIR 2002 SC 1771:
The question before a Constitution Bench in this case was
whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final
judgment/order of the Supreme Court, after dismissal of review petition (under
Article 137 of the Constitution), either under Article 32 of the Constitution
or otherwise. It was held that:
1. A final
judgment/order passed by Supreme Court cannot be assailed in an application
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an aggrieved person whether he
was a party to the case or not.
2. The
jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be
invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment/order passed by this
Court after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the
Constitution read with Order XI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
3. It was
pointed out above that Article 32 can be invoked only for the purpose of
enforcing the fundamental rights conferred in Part III and it is a settled
position in law that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial
proceedings can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in
Part III. It may further be noted that the superior courts of justice do not
also fall within the ambit of State or other authorities under Article 12 of
the Constitution.
4. Though
Judges of the highest Court do their best, subject of course to the limitation
of human fallibility, yet situations may arise in the rarest of the rare cases,
which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right
miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper
but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. Therefore,
the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over
the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in public
interest that a final judgment of the final Court in the country should not be
open to challenge yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein
declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience
and cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.
5. Therefore,
it was held that the Supreme Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure
a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its
inherent power. This was allowed by way of a curative petition.
6.
It was held that except when very strong
reasons exist, the Supreme Court should not entertain an application seeking
reconsideration of an order of the Court which has become final on dismissal of
a review petition. It is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the
grounds on which such a petition may be entertained. Nevertheless, a petitioner
is entitled to relief if he establishes (1) violation of principles of natural
justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely
affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with
notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge
failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving
scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the
petitioner.
7. Detailed
procedure for filing of curative petition was laid down in this case, inter alia, including, that the curative petition shall
contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of
the requirements for filing the curative petition.
People'S Union For
Democratic ... vs Union Of India & Others on 18 September, 1982
Equivalent citations:
1982 AIR 1473, 1983 SCR (1) 456
Public interest litigation is brought before the
court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of one individual against
another as happens in the case of ordinary litigation, but it is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands that violations of constitutional or
legal rights of large numbers of people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantaged
position should not go unnoticed and unredressed. That would be destructive of
the Rule of Law which forms one of the essential elements of public interest in any democratic form of government. The Rule of
Law does not mean that the protection of the law must be available only to a
fortunate few or that the law should be allowed to be prostituted by the
vested interests for
protecting and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement of their
civil and political rights. The poor too
have civil and political rights and the Rule of Law is meant for them also,
though today it exists only on paper and not in reality. People'S Union For Democratic ... vs Union Of India
& Others ,1982 AIR 1473, 1983 SCR (1) 456
In State of Uttranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal
& Ors., (2010) 3 SCC
402, in paragraphs 36, 96 and 103, it has been held thus:
"36. Public interest litigation is not in
the nature of adversarial litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity
to the government and its officers to make basic human rights meaningful to the
deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social and
economic justice which is the signature tune of our Constitution. The
Government and its officers must welcome public interest litigation because it
would provide them an occasion to examine whether the poor and the downtrodden
are getting their social and economic entitlements or whether they are
continuing to remain victims of deception and exploitation at the hands of
strong and powerful sections of the community and whether social and economic
justice has become a meaningful reality for them or it has remained merely a
teasing illusion and a promise of unreality, so that in case the complaint in
the public interest litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge of
their constitutional obligation root out exploitation and injustice and ensure
to the weaker sections their rights and entitlements.
Public interest litigation which is
strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which is
intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity,
is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary
traditional litigation which is essentially of an adversary
character where there is a dispute between two litigating
parties, one making claim or seeking relief against the
other and that other opposing such claim or resisting such
relief. Public interest litigation is brought before the
court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of one
individual against another as happens in the case of
ordinary litigation, but it is intended to promote and
indicate public interest which demands that violations of
constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who
are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically
disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and
unredressed. That would be destructive of the Rule of Law
which forms one of the essential elements of public interest
in any democratic form of Government. [467 C-F]
1:2. The Rule of Law does not mean that the protection
of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that
the law should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested
interests for protecting and upholding the status quo under
the guise of enforcement of their civil and political
rights. The poor too have civil and political rights and the
Rule of law is meant for them also, though today it exists
only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and
the alcohol kings have the Fundamental rights to carry on
their business and to fatten their purses by exploiting the
consuming public, certainly the "chamaras" to belonging
458
to the lowest strata of society have Fundamental Right to
earn on honest living through their sweat and toil. Large
numbers of men, women and children who constitute the bulk
of an population are today living a sub human existence in
conditions of object poverty; utter grinding poverty bas
broken their back and sapped their moral fibre. They have no
faith in the existing social and economic system. Nor can
these poor and deprived sections of humanity afford to
enforce their civil and political rights.
Supreme Court of India
Sanjeev Kumar Jain vs
Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust & ... on 12 October, 2011
The
provisions relating to costs should not however obstruct access to
courts and justice. Under no circumstances the costs should be a
deterrent, to a citizen with a genuine or bonafide claim, or to any person
belonging to the weaker sections whose rights have been affected, from
approaching the courts.
This
Hon’ble Court in Nilabati Behera [Supra], at para 21 has observed that
“…Article
9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which
indicates that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept
of enforcement of a guaranteed right. Article 9(5) reads as under: “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation”.
Court in Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa &
Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 746 at para 20 has held that
“…the court is
not helpless and the wide powers given to this Court by Article 32, which
itself is a fundamental right, imposes a constitutional obligation on this
Court to forge such new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete
justice and enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
which enable the award of monetary compensation in appropriate cases, where
that is the only mode of redress available”.
Industrial Development Cannot Be Done On The
Graves Of Human Being And At Cost Of Air And Water Quality : NGT https://www.livelaw.in/environment/industrial-development-cannot-be-done-149602
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India &
Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 161,
the Apex Court expressed thus:
"9. .....When the Court entertains public
interest litigation, it does not do so in a cavilling spirit or in a
confrontational mood or with a view to tilting at executive authority or
seeking to usurp it, but its attempt is only to ensure observance of social and
economic rescue programmes, legislative as well as executive, framed for the
benefit of the have- nots and the handicapped and to protect them against
violation of their basic human rights, which is also the constitutional obligation
of the executive. The Court is thus merely assisting in the realisation of the
constitutional objectives."
Thereafter,
their Lordships proceeded to hold as follows:
"55. .....In public interest litigation, the
role held by the Court is more assertive than in traditional actions.
PARLIAMENT
COULD NOT RESTRICT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
fundamental rights cannot be waived of.
To substantiate his plea, reliance is placed on following catena of decisions:
In Basheshar Nath v. C.I.T., it was held by the
Supreme Court that the fundamental right cannot be waived.
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, it was held by the
Supreme Court that although an undertaking was given by the appellants before
the High Court on behalf of the hut and pavement dwellers that they did not
claim any fundamental right to put huts on
pavements or public roads and that they will not obstruct the demolition of the
huts after a certain date, they could not be estopped from contending before
the Supreme Court that the huts constructed by them on the pavements cannot be
demolished because of their right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution. From this
decision also it follows that a fundamental right cannot be waived,
and there can be no estoppel.
It was held in case titled Yare Tali v. Tapak Tali (2002) 3 GLR 376
that the approach of the Court should be liberal and pragmatic so that no injustice is caused to the litigant who
has approached the Court with all the expectations of getting justice.
G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada AIR 2000 SC 1221 has laid down that a party cannot be penalized for his/her
previous negligence which has been overlooked or condoned earlier.
A.R. Vadodriya v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 2004 Bom.
8 wherein it is laid down that failure of the clerk of the Advocate to note the correct date of hearing in his diary
had been held as sufficient cause for restoration of the suit.
Tis hazari curt ak kuhar J Addl Distt Judge 14 May 2012 vijay kumar vs pratap singh CS 186/2009
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/94439021/
Frivilous PIL Cost Guidelines
Para 16……..The
attempt of the Courts must always be to minimize litigation and not
multiply it. An established maxim boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex
lite oritur; et interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium casts a duty upon
the Court to bring litigation to an end and to ensure that no
further litigation arises from its decisions. Judicial resources
are valuable and scarce. The resources of the Court are not infinite especially
in terms of judicial time. Therefore, administration of justice, in interest of
equity and fair play, demands that a view which discourages rather
than encourages litigation be taken. Delhi
High Court,Sh. Prem Prakash Chaudhary & Ors. vs Sh.
Rajinder Mohan Rana & Ors on 8 February, 2011
The
Government orders are in violation of principles of natural justice and opposed
to equity, justice and fair play.
Supreme
Court of India
Shangrila
Food Products Ltd. & Anr vs Life Insurance Corporation Of ... on 9 July,
1996
Equivalent
citations: 1996 SCC (5) 54, JT 1996 (6) 522
It is well-settled
that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take
cognisance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass
appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This
jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable
keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to
promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a
party priorty, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court
can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to
shed the unfair gain before granting relief.
While
for ordinary citizen , getting donation s may be taxable , but not illegal ,
for an NGO or specified persons it may be illegal and punishable.
STAY ORDER GUIDELINES
These
three aspects are to be considered while granting injunction also. In Kashi Math Samsthan &
Anr vs Srimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy & ... on 2 December, 2009, it was
observed thus: In an order of injunction, the party who seeks for grant of such
injunction has to prove that he has made out a prima facie case to go for
trial, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and he will suffer
irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted. But it is equally
well settled that when a party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial,
question of considering the balance of convenience or irreparable loss and
injury to the party concerned would not be material at all, that is to say, if
that party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to
the Court to grant injunction in his favour even if, he has made out a case of
balance of convenience being in his favour and would suffer irreparable loss
and injury if no injunction order is granted.
case
of Kashi Math Samsthan & anr.
Vs. Srimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy
& Appeal from Order No.4/2014 anr., reported in 2010 AIR (SC) 296
to submit that if the parties fail to prove prima facie case to go for trial,
it is not open to the Court to grant injunction in favour of such party even if
balance of convenience or irreparable loss or injury is shown
MISCONDUCT
CITATIONS
The Supreme Court in (9) State of Punjab and Ors. v. Ram Sing Ex. Constable, upon which Mr. Mukherjee himself has
placed reliance upon held:-
- 11 -
"5. Misconduct has
been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at Page 999 thus:
"A Transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong
behaviour, it synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency,
impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness.
Misconduct in offence has
been defined as:
"Any unlawful
behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful
in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to
perform, acts performed improperly and failure to act in the face of an
affirmative duty to act."
-------------------------
P. Ramanath Aiyar's Law
Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at Page 821 defines 'misconduct' thus:
"The term misconduct
implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment, Misconduct is
not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word
misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the
subject- matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the
scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally
means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness,
negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions of some established, but
indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the
actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of
discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden
- 12 -
act; carelessness, a
forbidden quality of an act and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office
may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public official by which
the rights of a party have been affected."
-----------------------------------
This aspect of the matter
has recently been considered by the Apex Court in Baldev Singh Gandhi vs. State of Punjab &
Ors.,
AIR 2002 SC 1124 in the following terms :
"9. 'Misconduct' has
not been defined in the Act. The word 'misconduct' is antithesis of the word
'conduct'. Thus, ordinarily the expression 'misconduct' means wrong or improper
conduct, unlawful behavior, misfeasance, wrong conduct, misdemeanour etc. There
being different meaning of the expression 'misconduct', we, therefore, have to
construe the expression 'misconduct' with reference to the subject and the
context wherein the said expression occurs. Regard being had to the aims and
objects of the statute......".
14. `Misconduct', inter
alia, envisages breach of discipline, although it would not be possible to lay
down exhaustively as to what would constitute conduct and indiscipline, which,
however, is wide enough to include wrongful omission or commission whether done
or omitted to be done intentionally or unintentionally. It means,
"improper behaviour; intentional wrong doing on deliberate violation of a
rule of standard or behaviour":
"Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it is a violation of
definite law, a forbidden act. It differs from carelessness. Misconduct even if
it is an offence under the Indian Penal Code is equally a
misconduct."
In (5) Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v.
Hindustan Motors Ltd.
reported in (1976) II LLJ 259 (264) SC, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court observed "standing orders of a company only describe certain cases of
misconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species of misconduct
which a workman may commit. Even though a given conduct may not come within the
specific terms of misconduct described in the standing order, it may still be a
misconduct in the special facts of a case, which it may not be possible to
condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action".
Even in the absence of
rules specifying misconduct, it would be open to the employee to consider
reasonably what conduct can be properly treated as misconduct.
See (6) W.M. Agnani v.
Badri Das reported in (1963) 1 LLJ page 684 at 690.
In (7) Delhi Cloth and General Mills
Co Ltd. v. Its Workmen reported in (1969) 2 LLJ 755 at 772 at Shah,
J. states "misconduct spreads over a wide and hazy spectrum of industrial
activity; the most seriously subversive conducts rendering an employee wholly
unfit for employment to mere technical default covered thereby".
----------------
Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct'
though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its
connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect
on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude,
it must be improper or wrong behavior; unlawful behavior, willful in character;
forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or
code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in
performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or
character."
In a clear and
loud message to all the lawyers, the
Supreme Court of India in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Lal
Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P. and others in Civil Appeal No(s). 4794 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 9527 of 2019) has sought to send an
unmistakable and stern message to them in unequivocal terms that everyone has
to be responsible and careful in what they present to the Court while firmly
and fully reiterating that a lawyer demeans himself if he acts merely as a mouthpiece of his client.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE The Hon’ble JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI S.A 8 of 2016
With CAN 9460 of 2019 Sri Biswanath Pal Vs. Sri Sankar Nath Pal & Ors.
'I am not unmindful to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
number of cases deprecated that trend of the higher judiciary of making
criticism or adverse remark against a judicial officer in a judiciary
pronouncement. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that unworthy
conduct of subordinate judicial officer cannot be overlooked. Power of superior
court to express its opinion and make even critical observations regarding the
conduct of judicial function by a judicial officer is undeniable, but the power
is to be exercised only when necessary for the purpose of reaching a decision
on the main controversy before it.'The
following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court may be relied on in support of
my observation:- (i) ‘K’ A Judicial Officer, in RE : (2001) 3 SCC 54. (ii) A.M.
Mathur vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta : (1990) 2 SCC 533 (iii) Niranjan Patnaik vs
Sashibhusan Kar & Anr : (1986) 2 SCC 569 (iv) Mona Panwar vs. High Court of
Judicature of Allahabad : (2011) 3 SCC 496.
SC:Without
poof of demand of bribe, no corruption case made out - Prevention of Corruption
Act - Ss. 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) - Illegal gratification.
Held, what
constitutes illegal gratification is question of law while whether on evidence
that crime is committed is question of fact - Where evidence regarding demand
and acceptance of bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace wholly
presumption of innocence, charge cannot be said to have been established - On
facts held, since proof of demand which is an indispensable essentiality was
absent, High Court was justified in quashing charges framed thereunder (Paras
28 and 29)
Case:State Vs.
Anup Kumar Srivastava
Citation:
(2017) 15 SCC
560; (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 816; AIR 2017 SC 3698
In non-cognizable offence judicial process initiates by lodging
a criminal complaint with the metropolitan magistrate, who then orders the
concerned police station
to investigate the crime accordingly, after which a charge sheet is filed with
the court, which is followed by the trial. After the trial, the court will pass
orders regarding the issue of a warrant to arrest the accused.
Also file a private complaint i.e. application in Judicial
Magistrate First Class’s court under S. 499 and S.500 of Indian Penal Code for
defamation against that woman. Once your case will be proved in court of Law as
you are innocent then she will be punished. You can simultaneously file a civil
suit under Law of tort for damages.
After Filing charge sheet by the police – If the charge sheet
has been filed on the basis of frivolous FIR, and the case is committed to
session judge and before commencement of trial, the accused can file a
discharge Application u/s 227 of CrPC, in order to get discharged from the
offence charged with on the basis of false FIR against him on the
following grounds–
That the charge sheet contains no prima facie evidence against
the accused in respect of the offence with which he is charged.
The trial cannot be commenced against the accused because of
insufficiency of evidence on record.
The evidence on record is inadmissible as evidence under the
Indian Evidence Act.
(iii) After the Commencement of trial – If the discharge
Application u/s 227 of CrPC filed by the accused has been rejected by Session
court, and the charge is framed and the trial is commenced then Application
under Section 232 of CrPC can only be made for the Acquittal of the Accused.
Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1 ,
observed that to prosecute the medical professionals for negligence under
criminal law, something more than mere negligence had to be proved. It said: 'In
Jacob Mathew's Case this Court clearly held that in criminal law medical
professionals are placed on a pedestal different from ordinary mortals. It was
further held that to prosecute the medical professionals for negligence under
criminal law, something more than mere negligence had to be proved. Medical
professionals deal with patients and they are expected to take the best
decisions in the circumstances of the case. Sometimes, the decision may not be
correct, and that would not mean that the medical professional is guilty of
criminal negligence. Such a medical profession may be liable to pay damages but
unless negligence of a high order is shown the medical professionals should not
be dragged into criminal proceedings. That is why in Jacob Mathew's case
(supra)this Court held that in case of criminal negligence against a medical
professional it must be shown that the accused did something or failed to do
something in the given facts and circumstances of the case which no medical
professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to
do.'
The Supreme Court acts as the Custodian of
Constitution of India because the Constitution itself has empowered the
Judiciary to review the laws enacted by the Parliament. Article 14 of the
Constitution states that if the law enacted by the legislature is ultra vires
to the Constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court gets the power to review
and repeal it.
Custodian
means a person entrusted with the custody or care of something.
Whenever
the Fundamental Rights are denied or restricted, it can be challenged in
the Supreme Court under Article 32;
The
dispute between Centre and State, can be settled in the Supreme
Court under Article 131;
Law
declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all the courts
in India under Article 141;
For
the enforcement of decrees - Article 142;
President
of India consulting Supreme Court under Article 143;
Supreme Court judgments are the law of the land ;
Whenever
a doubt arises regarding the Constitution, the Supreme Court will
interpret under Article 147 ;
Based
on the above facts, the Supreme Court takes care of the
Constitution.
So,
simply the Supreme Court is the Custodian of
the Constitution.
CONTEMPT OF COURT
In support of his contentions, the learned SPP has relied
upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
1. (2017)3 SCC 362 -
State of Karnataka Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others.
2. AIR 1998 SC 3299 - Ajay Kumar Pandey Vs. Veerendra Saran Hence,
he seeks to allow the contempt petition and to punish the accused as prayed for
in the petition.
AJAY KUMAR PANDEY VS. VEERENDRA SARAN reported in AIR 1998 SC
3299. Paragraph Nos.18 and 22 of the said judgment are relevant for our
purpose. In the said paragraphs, Their Lordships have held as under:
"18. The rule of
law is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of
the rule of law and if the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions
effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly
entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts has to be respected and
protected at all costs. It is for this reason that the courts are entrusted
with the extraordinary power of punishing those for contempt of Court who
indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine
the authority of the Courts and bring them in disrepute and disrespect thereby
obstructing them from discharging their judicial duties without fear or favour.
This power is exercised by the courts not to vindicate the dignity and honour
of any individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalised but with a
view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice. The
foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in
its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can
be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself".https://indiankanoon.org/doc/115155302/
The
contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his misconception of his
role and over-zealousness to assert himself and his side of the matter
intentionally overstepped his limits and conveniently ignored die above legal
position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of a judge in his
own cause. He has thus in effect not only challenged the jurisdiction of the
Court to discharge its functions but also its authority to do so.
Lower court
can not issue contempt notice
Delhi High Court
Syed Nusrat Ali vs State
& Anr. on 5 August, 2010https://indiankanoon.org/doc/137686299/
Chief Justice
S.A. Bobde, while hearing the maintainability of the Sabarimala reference
before a 9-judge bench, stated that the court has not “prejudicially affected
anyone’s rights” while making the reference. https://www.legalsarcasm.com/legal-national/court-has-not-prejudicially-affected-anyones-rights-by-making-the-reference-cji-bobde/
SC:Private complaint - Unexplained delay of a long period of more
than one year in filing - Ss. 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C.
Such delay rightly held by High Court to be a vulnerable circumstances
(Para 23).
Case:
Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan
Vs. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble.
Citation:
(2003) 7 SCC 749: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1918: AIR 2003 SC 4567.
SC:Cognizance of offence of
illegal mining quashed - lack of complaint by competent authority, but court
can proceed with trial for offence of theft of sand under S. 379 of IPC.
Offence of illegal mining -
Cognizance of - On complaint of State police - Validity - As per S.22 No court
can take cognizance of offence under Mines and Minerals Act of 1957, except on
complaint in writing by person authorized by Central or State Govt.- State
police was not authorized to make complaint – Cognizance of offence, illegal.
However court can take
cognizance of offence for theft of sand under section 379 of IPC, and the
other offences under special statute are quashed.
Case:
Kanwar Pal Singh Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh.
Citation:
2020 ALL SCR (Cri) 201
[ B ]:- Section 204 CRPC Cognizance of offence - Impugned order of
cognizance and summoning of accused, passed on a printed proforma by filling
gaps after filling blanks by Court employee and putting of signature by
Magistrate-Impugned order is wrong and illegal and without due application of
judicial mindhence set aside (Paras 5 & 6)
Raj Kumar v/s State of UP CRL-R 2816/10 [ HARSH KUMAR JJ ]
[ ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT ]
SC:Court’s jurisdiction to take cognizance - Foundation of -
Cr.P.C. Section 190.
Though police report is material on which cognizance is taken,
held (per curiam), from that it cannot be said that a valid and legal police
report is the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction to take cognizance.
Case:
M.C Mehta (Taj Corridor
Scam) Vs. Union of India.
Citation:
2007 1 110 (SC).
SC:Methods of taking cognizance of offence - Ss. 190 and 193
Cr.P.C.
The Code of Criminal Procedure has prescribed four known methods
of taking cognizance of offence by the court competent to try the same. The
court has to take cognizance of the offence before initiation of the proceeding can be contemplated. The
court called upon to take cognizance of the offence must apply its mind to the
facts placed before it either upon a police report or upon a complaint or in some
other manner the court came to know about it and in the case of Court of
Session upon commitment of the case by the Magistrate.
Case:
A. R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas
Sriniwas Nayak.
Citation:
(1984) 2 SCC 500: 1984 SCC (Cri) 277: AIR 1984 SC 718: 1984 Cri LJ
647: 1984 Boom LR 228.
SC:What is meaning of "taking Cognizance", how is it
taken.
Held, term though not statutorily defined, yet judicial
pronouncements give it a definite meaning and connotation - Cognizance broadly
means taking judicial notice by competent court of a causes or matter presented
before it so as to decide whether there is basis for initiating proceedings for
judicial determination - Words and phrases - "Cognizance" (para 34).
Case:
Subramanian Swamy Vs.
Manmohan Singh.
Citation:
(2012) 3 SCC 64: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri)
1041: AIR 2012 SC 1185: 2012 Cri LJ 1519: (2012) 4 ALD 109.
SC:Aim of contempt proceedings is “to deter men from offering any
indignities to a Court of Justice”.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - The aim of the contempt proceeding
is “to deter men from offering any indignities to a Court of Justice” and an
essential feature of the proceeding is the exercise of summary power by the
Court itself in regard to the delinquent.
Case:
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. State of Madras
Citation:
AIR 1952 SC 149, 151 : 1952 SCR 425: 1952 Cri LJ 832
SC:Magistrate has no power to direct further investigations, suo
moto or at request of Complainant, after cognizance is taken by the Court or
accused is discharged - particularly in absence of a request made by the
Investigation Officer.
Ss. 173(8), 156(3) and 202 - Relative scope of role and powers of
Magistrate under, explained - Power of Magistrate to direct further
investigation after cognizance has been taken/process issued or accused has
been discharged - Scope and limitations - Need for request for further
investigation by investigating agency before further investigation can be
directed under S. 173(8) - Absence of power of Magistrate to direct further
investigation either suo motu or on prayer made by complainant/informant, once
cognizance has been taken/process issued or accused has been discharged.
Case:
Amruthbai Shambhubhai Patel Vs. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel
Citation:
(2017) 4 SCC 177 : (2017) 2
SCC (Cri) 331 : AIR 2017 SC 774.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 168 OF 2020
Govind Prasad Kejriwal
.. Appellant(s) Versus
State of Bihar & Anr.
.. Respondent(s) Magistrate
While Holding Inquiry U/s 202 CrPC Required To Take A Broad View And a Prima
Facie Case: SC
Unequivocal(Clear) Statements Made By Counsel Will Be Binding On
Clients: SC [Read Judgment]
SC:Statements recorded by police under S. 161 of Cr.P.C. do not
constitute substantial evidence on it's own.
S. 161 - Statement recorded under S. 161 CrPC - Held, does not
constitute evidence that can be relied upon by court to convict an accused in
absence of substantive evidence - Absence of substantive inculpating evidence -
Conviction reversed.
Case:
Virendra Singh Vs. State of Haryana
Citation:
(2017) 11 SCC 126 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 878 : AIR 2017 SC 1228.
SC:Wherever investigation is stayed by HC, such cases should be
disposed of in 6 months preferably.
The authority of the High Court to order stay of investigation
pursuant to lodging of FIR, or trial in deserving cases is unquestionable. But
the exercise of this authority carries with it the responsibility to
expeditiously dispose of the power given to the High Courts and the same power
is to be exercised sparingly only to prevent an abuse of the process and to
promote the ends of justice. It is therefore clear that (i) such an
extraordinary power has to be exercised with due caution and circumspection,
(ii) once such a power is exercised, the High Court should not lose sight of
the case where it has exercised its extraordinary power of staying investigation
and trial, and (iii) the High Court should make it a point of finally disposing
of such proceedings as early as possible but preferably within six months from
the date the stay order is issued. (Para 55) Case:Imtiyaz Ahmad Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others.
Citation:
(2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases 688.
SC:HC should not compare disputed signatures with originals by
invoking S.73 of the Evidence Act, without the assistance of handwriting
experts.
Wherein in an Election Petition, the High Court on appreciation of
oral evidence found that witnesses examined on the side of the election
petitioner have either admitted that they have voted two times or they must be
deemed to have voted two times in view of similarity of signatures on two
counter foils alleged to be related to those witnesses, and proceeded to
compare the signatures found in the counterfoils to find out whether both the
signatures were to be by the same person, without the aid of an expert or the
evidence of persons conversant with the disputed signatures, the approach made
by the High Court was not in conformity with the spirit of section 73 of the
Evidence Act.
Case:
State of Delhi (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ram
Citation:
AIR 1979 SC 14
SC:Registration of FIR is mandatory if information given to police
discloses commission of cognizable offence - At that stage other considerations
such as genuineness or credibility of information not relevant - S. 154 Cr.P.C.
Registration of FIR is mandatory if the information given to the
police under Section 154 of the Code discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence. However, if no cognizable offence is bmade out in the information
given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police
can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited
purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed.
But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable
offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other
considerations are not not relevant at the stage of registration is falsely
given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible,
etc. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether
the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence. (Paras 6 and 8).
Case:
State of Telangana Vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani
Citation:
(2017) 2 SCC 779 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 142 : AIR 2017 SC 373.
SC:Courts have unrestricted power to add or alter any charge
before pronouncement of judgment.
S. 216 - Alteration of charge - Power of Courts - Held, there is
unrestricted power to add or alter any charge whenever court finds that
defective charge has been made or addition of new charge becomes necessary
after commencement of trial - But such addition or alteration has to be made
before pronouncement of Judgment (Para 11).
Case:
Jasvinder Saini Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi).
Citation:
(2013) 7 SCC 256: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 295: (2013) 202 DLT 61:
(2013) 128 AIC 183.
SC:Mere examination of complainant upon oath does not mean that
the Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence.
Taking of cognizance means application of mind to contents of complaint
and take judicial notice of offence. Mere examination of complainant upon oath
does not mean that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence.
Case:
SR Sukumar VS. S Sunaad
Raghuram
Citation:
AIR 2015 SC 2757
SC: S. 154 Cr.P.C.- First information report need not necessarily
contain details as to each and every particular injury sustained by deceased.
FIR - S. 154 Cr.P.C. - It needs to contain only some information
about the crime and some information about the manner in which the offence has been committeed - It is
not required to contain minute details of whole crime be(Para 9).
Case:Sunil Khergade Vs. State of Maharashtra
Citation:(2016) 15 SCC 773 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 785 : (2015) 153
AIC 58 : AIR 2015 SC Supp Supp 2251.
SC:Taking cognizance without application of mind - proceeding is
liable to be set aside.
Where the court took cognizance and issued process but there is no
indication of application of mind to allegation in complaint, the order by
Magistrate calling appellant/accused to defend criminal proceedings is liable
to be set aside.
Case:
S Satyanaryana VS. Energo
Masch Power Engg & Const PL
Citation:AIR 2015 SC 2166
SC:Uncalled remarks against Advocate expunged.
Advocates – Adverse remarks – Expunging of Certain adverse remarks
passed by High Court against advocate - Found to be uncalled for and
unnecessary - Hence, liable to be expunged from record.
Case:
Balaji Associates Vs. State of Maharashtra. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171632672/
Supreme
Court of India
Balaji Associates
Through Its ... vs The State Of Maharashtra on 27 August, 2019
Citation:
2020(1) ALL MR 410 (S.C.)
Investigating Officer sentenced to 6 weeks imprisonment for not following Section 41-A
of CrPc haven't issued Notice to the
Accused before Arrested
SC:Dismissal of writ petition in liminie withouta speaking order
will not act as res Judicata.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 10 - Dismissal of writ
petition in limine or laches or availability of alternative remedy would not
operate as res judicata.
Held: Where a writ petition after contest is disposed of on merits
by a speaking order, the question decided in that petition would operate as res
judicata, but not dismissal in limine or dismissal on the ground of laches or
availability of alternative remedy.
Case: Pujari Bai VS. Madan Gopal
Citation:AIR 1989 SC 1764
BomHC: Defamation if not made out in one communication, can't be
made out in another based on same allegations, process issued by Magistrate is
quashed
Defamation - Indian Penal Code (1860), Ss. 499, 500, 109, 34 - CRPC (1973), Ss. 200,
202 - Companies Act (2013), Ss. 169, 213 - Defamation - Issuance of process -
Petition against - Removal of respondent - independent Director by Company for
loss of confidence - Issuance of statutory special notice giving backdrop of
material as to acts of respondent, necessitating initiation of action of his
removal - Imputations in said statutory notice cannot be termed as “per se
defamatory” - Moreover, it had ultimately resulted in removal of respondent
from company by requisite majority - Further, no mens rea can be attributed to
Petitioners, Directors Officers of Company - Petitioners cannot be said to have
an intention to cause harm to reputation of respondent - Petitioners cannot be
held vicariously liable and no malice can be attributed to them, since power
u/s 169 of Companies Act, 2013 has been exercised by Company, a corporate entity
- Therefore, issuance of process to Petitioners and holding that imputations
contained in special notice was per se defamatory, illegal - Moreso when no
offence of defamation made out since imputations have not been contained in
special notice for first time but also in representation offered by respondent
by availing statutory remedy and addressing independent letter to shareholders.
Case:
Ratan N. Tata Vs. State of Maharashtra.
Citation:(2020) ALL MR (Cri)
409
SC: S. 190 Cr.PC - Allegation that accused persons transferred
shares on the basis of forged and fabricated signatures - Criminalcourts can
also proceed simultaneously.
Mere filing of a claim before the Consumer Forum would not make
the dispute a civil dispute - Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 406, 420, 467, 468 and
120-B. Criminal case could still be prosecuted.
Case:Ashok Chaturvedi Vs. Shitul H. Chanchani
Citation:
(1998) 7 SCC 698 : AIR 1998 SC 2796.
--------------------------------------------------------
SC:Custody Girl child of 12 years handed to father as girl preferred
so, mother gets visitation rights
Custody of Child
Guardians and Wards Act (1890), Sec 7 - Custody of minor daughter
- Grant of, to father - Validity - Girl who is over 12 years of age is
certainly capable of forming an intelligent preference regarding her custody -
Girl expressed her definite desire to reside with her father - She stated that
she received love and affection from her father, who was taking care of her
food, education and would assist her in her school projects and activities - Counselors
also in their report stated that girl is comfortable with her father - Grant of
custody rights to father and visitation rights to mother, proper.
Case:DSG Vs. AKG.
Citation:(2020) ALL SCR
(Cri) 218
SC: Not mentioning names of accused in FIR.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 154 - Not mentioning names
of accused in FIR - No ground to doubt contents of FIR - Prosecution case
cannot be thrown out on this ground.
Case:
Latesh @ Dadu Baburao Karlekar Vs. The State of Maharashtra
Citation:2018 (1) Supreme
524 : (2018) 186 AIC 227 : (2018) 1 AICLR 856 : (2018) AIR (SCW) 659 : (2018) 2
AIRBomR (Cri) 13 : (2018) AIR (SC) 659 : (2018) 1 AllCrlRulings 843 : (2018)
AllSCR (Crl) 311 : (2018) 1 AndhLD (Criminal) 542 : (2018) 1 BomCR (Cri) 594 :
(2018) 1 CalCriLR 206 : (2018) 2 CriCC 505 : (2018) CriLJ 1812 : (2018) CriLR
173 : (2018) 1 Crimes 95 : (2018) Supl CutLT (Criminal) 504 : (2018) 2 ECrC 24
: (2018) 1 JBCJ 412 : (2018) 2 JCC 762 : (2018) 1 JLJR 321 : (2018) 2 JT 27 :
(2018) 1 LawHerald(SC) 145 (2018) 2 MLJ (Criminal) 168 : (2018) 69 OrissaCriR
892 : (2018) 1 PCCR 197 : (2018) 2 PLJR 1 : (2018) 1 RajCriC 385 : (2018) 5
RCR(Criminal) 58 : (2018) 2 RLW 1551 : (2018) 1 Scale 626 : (2018) 3 SCC 66 :
(2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 235 (2018) 1 SCCriR 156.
HC:Defamation, 500 IPC - Reputation is not at all a fact necessary
to be proved in Criminal defamation.
Reputation is not at all a necessary fact to be proved in a charge
under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, and hence it does not become a fact
in issue.
Citation:32 Pat 276 : 1954
Cr LJ 121 : AIR 1954 Pat 84.
SC:If certain salient pieces of evidence were missed or were not
appreciated, the Supreme Court will interfere.
The Supreme Court will not readily interfere with the finding of
fact given by the High Court but if the High Court acts perversely or otherwise
improperly, interference by the Supreme Court is called for. Where the
judgement of the lower Court shows that certain salient pieces of evidence were
missed or were not appreciated, the Supreme Court will interfere
Case:
State of Madras Vs. Vaidyanatha Iyer
Citation:
AIR 1958 SC 61 : 1958 Cr LJ
232 : 1958 SCR 580.
SC:No infirmity attached to the testimony of police officials
merely because they belong to police force.
Police as Witness - It is well settle that credibility of witness
has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is
quite possible that in a given case, a Court of law may not base conviction
solely on the evidence of complaint or a police official but it is not the law
that police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be
accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent
evidence. The presumption that every person acts honestly applies as much in
favour of a police official as any other person. No infirmity attached to the
testimony of police officials merely because they belong to police force. The
rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. But, if
the Court is convicted that what was stated by a witness has a ring of truth,
conviction can be based on such evidence.
Case:State of Maharashtra Vs. Damu Gopinath Shinde
Citation:
AIR 2000 SC 1691
SC:Registrars and other Officers under Co-operative Societies Act
are not "public servants" within the ambit of S. 21 of the Indian
Penal Code.
A "public servant" within the meaning of S. 2 of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, is not a "public
servant" within the meaning of S. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
1947 by virtue of the provisions of S. 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960, read with S. 21 of the I. P. Code. It is undoubtedly true
that the Co-operative Societies Act has been enacted by the State Legislature
and their powers to make such legislation is derived from Entry 32 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Legislature, no doubt, in S.
161 of 1960 Act, has referred to the provisions of S. 21 of the I. P. Code. But
such reference would not make the Registrars and other Officers under
Co-operative Societies Act "public servants" within the ambit of S.
21 of the I. P. Code.
Case:
State of Maharashtra Vs. Laljit Singh Shah
Citation:
AIR 2000 SC 937 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 533 : (2000) 2 SCC 699.
SC:Chief Justice of India & High Courts and their respective
CJs are public authorities within the meaning of RTI law - Right to Information
Act (2005), S. 2(h).
Constitution of India, Arts. 124, 214 - Public authority - Supreme
Court is a public authority - And office
of Chief Justice is not separate from Supreme Court - Hence, there will be only
one CPIO - Equally true is about High Courts and their respective CJs.
Case:Central Public Information Officer Vs. Subhash Chandra
Agarwal
Citation:2019 ALL SCR 2593.
----------------------------------
SC:Professional misconduct means conduct which would reasonably be
regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by legal practitioners of good repute
and efficiency - mere negligence won't be professional misconduct, though the
client may be entitled to a compensation from his counsel.
Advocates Act 1961, S. 35 - Professional misconduct means conduct
which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by legal
practitioners of good repute and efficiency. Mere negligence, even of a serious
character will not suffice to found a charge of Professional misconduct. But if
counsel, by his acts or omission causes the interest of the party, engaging him
in any legal proceedings to be prejudicially affected, he does so at his peril
and the party is entitled to compensation from his own counsel.
Case:
Manjit Kaur Vs. Deol Bus Service
Citation:AIR 1989 P & H
183 at p. 185, (1989) 95 PLR 497, ILR (1989), P & H 370.
SC:Without poof of demand of bribe, no corruption case made out -
Prevention of Corruption Act - Ss. 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) - Illegal
gratification.
Held, what constitutes illegal gratification is question of law
while whether on evidence that crime is committed is question of fact - Where
evidence regarding demand and acceptance of bribe leaves room for doubt and
does not displace wholly presumption of innocence, charge cannot be said to
have been established - On facts held, since proof of demand which is an
indispensable essentiality was absent, High Court was justified in quashing
charges framed thereunder (Paras 28 and 29).
Case:
State Vs. Anup Kumar Srivastava
Citation:
(2017) 15 SCC 560; (2018) 1
SCC (Cri) 816; AIR 2017 SC 3698
SC:Fair trial - Court's duty to ensure that witnesses depose
truthfully and fearlessly.
Held, fair trial is possible only when witnesses are truthful as
they are the eyes and ears of the court - Thus, it is necessary to ensure that
trial is conducted fairly where witnesses are able to depose truthfully and
fearlessly - Constitution of India, Art, 21 - CrPC, 1973, S. 309 - Evidence Act
1872, Ss. 167 and 154
Case:Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki Vs. State of Gujarat
Citation:(2018) 11 SCC 129;
(2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 430; AIR 2017 SC 5690
SC: Supreme Court's power to punish for contempt of itselfa d
lower courts - Scope - Taking suo motu cognizance of contempt of ITAT - is
Legal and proper.
Held, Supreme Court can punish not only for contempt of itself but
also for contempt of all courts and tribunals subordinate to it including
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Taking suo motu cognizance of contempt of ITAI
by Supreme Court, although would render the contemner unable to appeal to any
other court, held, not improper - Hence, the contemnor's contention that the
Supreme Court, rejected - Further held, S. 15 of Contempt of Courts Act also
empowers Supreme Court Rules - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Ss. 15 and 2(c) -
Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss. 2(4) and 252 & 254.
Case:ITAT Vs. V. K. Agrawal
Citation:(1999) 1 SCC 16 : SC 452 AIR 1999.
-----------------------------------------------------
SC:False statement on oath is perjury - Notice issued.
Person verifying factually incorrect statement in SLP about High
Court proceedings - Notice issued to show cause why contempt of court/ perjury
proceedings be not instituted against him.
Penal Code, 1860, S. 191 - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 2(c).
Case:Timber (P) Ltd. Vs. Wazir Jai Singh,
Citation:1999 SCC (Cri) 347.
SUPREME COURT DIRECTION ON ARREST;
In view of the increasing incidence of violence and torture in
custody, the
Supreme Court of India (in D.K.Basu vs. State of West Bengal
(1997) AIR 1997
SC 610) has laid down 11 specific requirements and procedures that
the police
and other agencies have to follow for the arrest, detention and
interrogation of any
person. These are:
1. Police arresting and
interrogating suspects should wear “accurate, visible and
clear” identification and name
tags, and details of interrogating police officers
should be recorded in a register.
2. A memo of arrest must be
prepared at the time of arrest. This should:
Have the time and date of arrest.
be attested by at least one
witness who may either be a family member of
the person arrested or a
respectable person of the locality where the arrest was
made.
be counter-signed by the person arrested.
3. The person arrested, detained
or being interrogated has a right to have a
relative, friend or well-wisher
informed as soon as practicable, of the arrest and the
place of detention or custody. If
the person to be informed has signed the arrest
memo as a witness this is not
required.
4. Where the friend or relative
of the person arrested lives outside the district, the
time and place of arrest and
venue of custody must be notified by police within 8 to
12 hours after arrest. This
should be done by a telegram through the District Legal
Aid Authority and the concerned
police station.
5. The person arrested should be
told of the right to have someone informed of
the arrest, as soon as the arrest
or detention is made.
6. An entry must be made in the
diary at the place of detention about the arrest,
the name of the person informed
and the name and particulars of the police
officers in whose custody the
person arrested is.
7. The person being arrested can
request a physical examination at the time
of arrest. Minor and major
injuries if any should be recorded. The
"Inspection Memo"
should be signed by the person arrested as well as the
arresting police officer. A copy
of this memo must be given to the person arrested.
8. The person arrested must have
a medical examination by a qualified
doctor every 48 hours during
detention. This should be done by a doctor who is on
the panel, which must be
constituted by the Director of Health Services of every
State.
9. Copies of all documents
including the arrest memo have to be sent to the Area
Magistrate (laqa Magistrate) for
his
record.
10. The person arrested has a
right to meet a lawyer during the interrogation,
although not for the whole time.
11. There should be a police
control room in every District and State headquarters
where information regarding the
arrest and the place of custody of the person arrested
must be sent by the arresting
officer. This must be done within 12 hours of the arrest
The control room should
prominently display the information on a notice
board.
These requirements were issued to
the Director General of Police and the
Home Secretary of every State.
They were obliged to circulate the
requirements to every police
station under their charge. Every police station
in the country had to display
these guidelines prominently. The judgment also
encouraged that the requirements
be broadcast through radio and television and
pamphlets in local languages be
distributed to spread awareness.
These requirements are in
addition to other rights
and rules, such as:
• The right to be informed at the
time of arrest of the offence for which the person is
being arrested.
• The right to be presented before
a magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest.
• The right not to be ill-treated
or tortured during arrest or in custody.
• Confessions made in police
custody cannot be used as evidence against the accused.
• A boy under 15 years of age and
women cannot be called to the police station only for
questioning.
[ D ]:- Section 197(1)(3) CRPC Police Act, Section 29 Allegation
upto effect that the petitioner-police officer failed to get the summons of one
of the witnesses in a criminal case returned either served or unserved to the
trial Court-Further allegation that he did not response to the show cause
notice issued by the trial Court seeking the explanation as to why the summons of the witness has not been
returned served or unserved-Act or omission on part of him is very much
connected to his official duty Proceedings are liable to be terminated for lack
of prosecution sanction. (Paras 13, 14, 16 to 19)
VK Godika v/s State of
Rajasthan CMP 2403/14 [ VIJAY JJ ]
[ RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT ]
Further the petitioners argue that section
92(2) of CrPC empowers the police to seek such information for an ongoing
investigation and also stated that the Ministry of Communication and
Information Technology has issued circular in this regard in 2014. The advocate
for the petitioners Mr. CV Nagesh further argued that the question of vicarious
liability would not arise out of a criminal proceeding. http://lawtimesjournal.in/in-case-alleging-disclosure-of-call-details-without-consent-against-airtel-chairman-and-md-karnataka-high-court-quashes-charges/
Hurray🕺🏾Its
crystal clear now that; Private property is a human right: Determined on 13th
Jan’2020; by The Hon’ble Supreme Court
'Govt Servant Has Right To
Free Speech' : Tripura HC Sets Aside Suspension Of Staff For Attending
Political Rally & FB Post [Read Judgment]
Educational Institutions
Comes Within The Meaning Of 'Establishments' Under Section 1(5) Of The ESI Act,
1948 : Calcutta HC [Read Judgment] https://www.reddyandreddy.org/educational-institutions-comes-within-the-meaning-of-establishments-under-section-15-of-the-esi-act-1948-calcutta-high-court/
SC:Cheating or breach of
trust is not part of duty of a government servant - Sanction for prosecution
not required.
For offences under sections
406 and 409 read with section 120-B of the IPC, sanction under section 197 of
the Cr PC is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution.Sections 406
and 409 of the IPC are cognate offences in which the common component is
criminal breach of trust. When the offender in the offence under section 406 is
a public servant(or holding any one of the positions listed in the section),
the offence would escalate to section 409 of the IPC read with section 120-B,
it is not part of duty of the public servant to enter into a criminal
conspiracy for committing breach of trust, there was no sense in stating that
if the offence is under section 406 read with section 120-B, IPC, it would make
all the difference vis-a-vis section 197 of the Cr. P.C .
Case:
State of Kerala Vs. V
Padmanabhan.
Citation:
AIR 1999 SC 2405
Negligence tantamount to
dereliction of duties would be misconduct. This judgement has failed to
consider this aspect which could have resulted in a huge loss of revenue to the
exchequer. Moreover in all corruption cases unless the accused I'd caught red
handed, it's difficulty to establish quid pro quo.
A
wrong decision does not give a right to a person to enforce the wrong order and
claim equality: Delhi HC
Link to Judgment: https://www.reddyandreddy.org/a-wrong-decision-does-not-give-a-right-to-a-person-to-enforce-the-wrong-order-and-claim-equality-delhi-hc/
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