VIOLATIONS OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA RULINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE INTEREST OF SELECTED PEOPLES
But on 5th Sept 2019 Chief Justice Pradeep Nandrajog Bench imposed penalty on Petitioner of Rs 5lacs knowing that his income is less than Rs 1lac per annum. Same Chief Justice Pradeep Nandrajog did not allowed his son admission in vacant RTE 25% seat because father file PILs at Court. Now the High Court Staffs are not accepting any affidavit , applications , motions in earlier filed matter also. Registrar Judicial Shri VR Kachare informed petitioner that he cannot file any thing in earlier matters as per direction from CJ Bench .Petitioner Sapan Shrivastava is unable to follow his old matters in the temple of Justice after the order in Civil PIL 159/2016. Now he cannot approach Bombay High Court for his personal issues also. Many people warned petitioner for raising corporate corruption and they was knowing that one day such thing will happen. Sapan Shrivastava is filing and arguing matters as party in person . Many party in persons are assisting each others in Bombay high Court. As per CJ order petitioner also can not file review or recall application at Bombay High Court as gates has been closed in the temple of Justice. It is day light violation of Supreme court order of access to Justice . Complaint registered at Supreme court and dairy number has been issued but no update received till date.
Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan,
( (2016) 8 SCC 509 ) has held that access of justice is an integral part of the guarantee
contained in Article
21 and 14 of the Constitution of India which
guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law to not only citizens
but non-citizens also.
Supreme Court of India
Sanjeev Kumar Jain vs Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust & ... on 12 October, 2011
The provisions relating to costs should not however obstruct access to courts and justice. Under no circumstances the costs should be a deterrent, to a citizen with a genuine or bonafide claim, or to any person belonging to the weaker sections whose rights have been affected, from approaching the courts.
Common sense – first principle
Menka GandhiVs. Union of India, (1978) article 21 In Maneka Gandhi vs the Union of India (1978 AIR SC 597), the apex court held that the "procedure" under Article 21 had to be fair, just and reasonable, and would have to be also tested with Article 14 (equality) and 19 (the freedoms) thereby ushering in the era of "substantive due process".
Mohd. Yunus Khan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
reported in 2010 (6) SLR 1988,
Para 16. Our
Constitution protects not only the life and liberty
but
also the dignity of every person. Life convicts and hardcore
criminals
deprived of personal liberty are also not wholly denuded of their
Constitutional rights. Arbitrariness is an anathema to the principles
of reasonableness and fairness enshrined in our constitutional
provisions. The rule of law prohibits the exercise of power
in an arbitrary manner and/or in a manner that travels beyond the
boundaries of reasonableness. Thus, a statutory authority is not permitted
to act whimsically/arbitrarily. Its actions should be guided by
the principles of reasonableness and fairness. The authority cannot
be permitted to abuse the law or to use
it unfairly.
The
legal maxim “nemo debet esse judex in propria
causa” (no
man
shall be a judge in his own cause) is required to be observed by all
judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as non-observance thereof is treated
as a violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide Secretary to Government, Transport Department v.
Munuswamy Mudaliar & Anr.,
AIR 1988 SC 2232; Meenglas Tea Estate v.The Workmen, AIR
1963 SC 1719; and Mineral Development Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 468).
This
Court in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of
Gujarat &
Anr., (2009)
11 SCC 84, placed reliance upon the judgment in Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC
417,
and held that no person should
adjudicate a dispute which he or she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this principle
creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said
person.
Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case wherein
he is interested. The question is not whether the person is actually
biased but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable
apprehension in the minds of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the
decision.
Vinod Seth v Devinder Bajaj and another, 2010 (7) SCR 424=2010 (8) SCC 1.
16. This case reminds us of the adage: "Hard cases make bad law". Black's Law Dictionary defines a `hard case' thus : "A law suit involving equities that tempt a judge to stretch or even disregard a principle of law at issue --- hence the expression "Hard cases make bad law". Justice Holmes explained and extended the adage thus : (See his dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 (1903) US 197) :
"Great cases, like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes whatpreviously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend."
This is certainly a hard case. The High Court should have resisted from laying down a `bad law', which will be treated as a precedent and will result in similar directions by courts, wherever they feel that suits are not likely to succeed. It would encourage, in fact even force, the losing party to file an appeal or further appeal against the final decision in the suit. This is because no plaintiff would like to undertake to pay a large sum as damages, nor would a defendant like to miss a chance to receive a large sum as damages. Such orders would also tempt and instigate both the parties to make attempts to succeed in the suit by hook or crook, by adopting means fair or foul. If litigants are to be subjected to such directions in terrorem, the litigant public will be dissuaded from approaching courts, even in regard to bona fide claims. Such orders may lead to gradual loss of faith in the judiciary and force litigants to think of extra-judicial remedies by seeking the help of underworld elements or police to settle/enforce their claims thereby leading to break-down of rule of law. No order or direction of the High Court, even if it is intended to deter vexatious and frivolous litigation, should lead to obstruction of access to courts.
23 (e) The provisions relating to costs should not however obstruct access to courts and justice. Under no circumstances the costs should be a deterrent, to a citizen with a genuine or bonafide claim, or to any person belonging to the weaker sections whose rights have been affected, from approaching the courts.
Right to access to Courts is now recognized as a basic human right and
its origin can be traced to Art. 8 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the United
Nations Organisation in 1948 and to Art. 2 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
which India is a party.
SUPREME COURT STAND ON PIL
People'S Union For
Democratic ... vs Union Of India & Others on 18 September, 1982
Equivalent citations:
1982 AIR 1473, 1983 SCR (1) 456
Public interest litigation which is
strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which is
intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity,
is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary
traditional litigation which is essentially of an adversary
character where there is a dispute between two litigating
parties, one making claim or seeking relief against the
other and that other opposing such claim or resisting such
relief. Public interest litigation is brought before the
court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of one
individual against another as happens in the case of
ordinary litigation, but it is intended to promote and
indicate public interest which demands that violations of
constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who
are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically
disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and
unredressed. That would be destructive of the Rule of Law
which forms one of the essential elements of public interest
in any democratic form of Government. [467 C-F]
1:2. The Rule of Law does not mean that the protection
of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that
the law should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested
interests for protecting and upholding the status quo under
the guise of enforcement of their civil and political
rights. The poor too have civil and political rights and the
Rule of law is meant for them also, though today it exists
only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and
the alcohol kings have the Fundamental rights to carry on
their business and to fatten their purses by exploiting the
consuming public, certainly the "chamaras" to belonging
458
to the lowest strata of society have Fundamental Right to
earn on honest living through their sweat and toil. Large
numbers of men, women and children who constitute the bulk
of an population are today living a sub human existence in
conditions of object poverty; utter grinding poverty bas
broken their back and sapped their moral fibre. They have no
faith in the existing social and economic system. Nor can
these poor and deprived sections of humanity afford to
enforce their civil and political rights.
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